GHSA-VC72-G5GR-JP4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-30 09:32 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: avoid overflows in dirty throttling logic
The dirty throttling logic is interspersed with assumptions that dirty limits in PAGE_SIZE units fit into 32-bit (so that various multiplications fit into 64-bits). If limits end up being larger, we will hit overflows, possible divisions by 0 etc. Fix these problems by never allowing so large dirty limits as they have dubious practical value anyway. For dirty_bytes / dirty_background_bytes interfaces we can just refuse to set so large limits. For dirty_ratio / dirty_background_ratio it isn't so simple as the dirty limit is computed from the amount of available memory which can change due to memory hotplug etc. So when converting dirty limits from ratios to numbers of pages, we just don't allow the result to exceed UINT_MAX.
This is root-only triggerable problem which occurs when the operator sets dirty limits to >16 TB.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42131"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-30T08:15:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: avoid overflows in dirty throttling logic\n\nThe dirty throttling logic is interspersed with assumptions that dirty\nlimits in PAGE_SIZE units fit into 32-bit (so that various multiplications\nfit into 64-bits). If limits end up being larger, we will hit overflows,\npossible divisions by 0 etc. Fix these problems by never allowing so\nlarge dirty limits as they have dubious practical value anyway. For\ndirty_bytes / dirty_background_bytes interfaces we can just refuse to set\nso large limits. For dirty_ratio / dirty_background_ratio it isn\u0027t so\nsimple as the dirty limit is computed from the amount of available memory\nwhich can change due to memory hotplug etc. So when converting dirty\nlimits from ratios to numbers of pages, we just don\u0027t allow the result to\nexceed UINT_MAX.\n\nThis is root-only triggerable problem which occurs when the operator\nsets dirty limits to \u003e16 TB.",
"id": "GHSA-vc72-g5gr-jp4w",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:33:58Z",
"published": "2024-07-30T09:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-398330.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-613116.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b2d2b8766db028bd827af34075f221ae9e9efff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/385d838df280eba6c8680f9777bfa0d0bfe7e8b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d3817b64eda07491bdd86a234629fe0764fb42a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a49389771ae7666f4dc3426e2a4594bf23ae290"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e0b5e7f2895eccef5c2a0018b589266f90c4805"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a25e8536184516b55ef89ab91dd2eea429de28d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd16a7ee339aef3ee4c90cb23902afb6af379ea0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c83ed422c24f0d4b264f89291d4fabe285f80dbc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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