GHSA-VC4V-Q632-X9G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
unshare: don't drop active namespace references that were never taken
Active references on the namespaces of an nsproxy are taken when the nsproxy is installed into a task in switch_task_namespaces() and copy_namespaces() and dropped again by put_nsproxy() through deactivate_nsproxy().
But ksys_unshare() calls put_nsproxy() on an nsproxy that was never installed when set_cred_ucounts() fails. The new namespaces of that nsproxy go from zero to minus one and the namespaces shared with the caller lose a reference that belongs to the nsproxy the caller keeps using:
WARNING: kernel/nscommon.c:171 at __ns_ref_active_put+0x1cd/0x230 nsproxy_ns_active_put deactivate_nsproxy ksys_unshare
Afterwards the namespaces the caller lives in aren't listed by listns() anymore. set_cred_ucounts() only fails when alloc_ucounts() can't allocate and it only allocates when the real uid of the caller differs from its effective uid.
Commit cefd55bd2159 ("nsproxy: fix free_nsproxy() and simplify create_new_namespaces()") separated the two cases on purpose. nsproxy_free() frees an nsproxy that was prepared but never installed and that's what a failed setns() uses in put_nsset(). Export it and use it for a failed unshare() as well.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98983"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:20Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nunshare: don\u0027t drop active namespace references that were never taken\n\nActive references on the namespaces of an nsproxy are taken when the\nnsproxy is installed into a task in switch_task_namespaces() and\ncopy_namespaces() and dropped again by put_nsproxy() through\ndeactivate_nsproxy().\n\nBut ksys_unshare() calls put_nsproxy() on an nsproxy that was never\ninstalled when set_cred_ucounts() fails. The new namespaces of that\nnsproxy go from zero to minus one and the namespaces shared with the\ncaller lose a reference that belongs to the nsproxy the caller keeps\nusing:\n\n WARNING: kernel/nscommon.c:171 at __ns_ref_active_put+0x1cd/0x230\n nsproxy_ns_active_put\n deactivate_nsproxy\n ksys_unshare\n\nAfterwards the namespaces the caller lives in aren\u0027t listed by listns()\nanymore. set_cred_ucounts() only fails when alloc_ucounts() can\u0027t\nallocate and it only allocates when the real uid of the caller differs\nfrom its effective uid.\n\nCommit cefd55bd2159 (\"nsproxy: fix free_nsproxy() and simplify\ncreate_new_namespaces()\") separated the two cases on purpose.\nnsproxy_free() frees an nsproxy that was prepared but never installed\nand that\u0027s what a failed setns() uses in put_nsset(). Export it and use\nit for a failed unshare() as well.",
"id": "GHSA-vc4v-q632-x9g5",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98983"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b6f31a3c0b16066f812e94b52a704174a6f23cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56fe03a0c05dba4c5f6a23c391f96de1614a098c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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