GHSA-V9VH-VJ86-FH3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30A NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in the PFE management daemon (evo-pfemand) of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on ACX7024, ACX7024X, ACX7100-32C, ACX7100-48L, ACX7348, ACX7509 devices allows an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a
Denial-of-Service (DoS).
Whenever specific valid multicast traffic is received on any layer 3 interface the evo-pfemand process crashes and restarts.
Continued receipt of specific valid multicast traffic results in a sustained Denial of Service (DoS) attack. This issue affects Junos OS Evolved on ACX7024, ACX7024X, ACX7100-32C, ACX7100-48L, ACX7348, ACX7509:
- from 23.2R2-EVO before 23.2R2-S4-EVO,
- from 23.4R1-EVO before 23.4R2-EVO.
This issue affects IPv4 and IPv6.
This issue does not affect Junos OS Evolved ACX7024, ACX7024X, ACX7100-32C, ACX7100-48L, ACX7348, ACX7509 versions before 23.2R2-EVO.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59967"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-09T16:15:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in the PFE management daemon (evo-pfemand) of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on ACX7024,\u00a0ACX7024X,\u00a0ACX7100-32C,\u00a0ACX7100-48L,\u00a0ACX7348,\u00a0ACX7509 devices allows an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a \n\nDenial-of-Service (DoS).\n\nWhenever specific valid multicast traffic is received on any layer 3 interface the evo-pfemand process crashes and restarts.\n\nContinued receipt of specific valid multicast traffic\u00a0results in a sustained Denial of Service (DoS) attack. \nThis issue affects Junos OS Evolved on ACX7024, ACX7024X,\u00a0ACX7100-32C, ACX7100-48L, ACX7348, ACX7509:\u00a0\n\n\n\n * from 23.2R2-EVO before 23.2R2-S4-EVO,\u00a0\n * from 23.4R1-EVO before 23.4R2-EVO.\n\n\nThis issue affects IPv4 and IPv6. \n\nThis issue does not affect Junos OS Evolved ACX7024, ACX7024X,\u00a0ACX7100-32C, ACX7100-48L, ACX7348, ACX7509\u00a0versions before 23.2R2-EVO.",
"id": "GHSA-v9vh-vj86-fh3j",
"modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:36Z",
"published": "2025-10-09T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59967"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportportal.juniper.net/JSA103156"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:A/V:C/RE:M/U:Green",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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