GHSA-V93P-6W5H-WMXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Guard page-fault worker with runtime PM check
During VM teardown, the VM's runtime PM reference is dropped asynchronously, allowing the device to autosuspend while stale page faults belonging to the now-dead VM are still queued. When the page-fault worker later tries to ack one of these, it calls into guc_ct_send_locked() on an already-suspended device, tripping:
Assertion !xe_pm_runtime_suspended(xe) failed!
WARNING at xe_device.c:1267 xe_device_assert_mem_access+0x11c/0x140 [xe]
A live VM/exec queue always holds a PM reference while it has outstanding work, so if the device is suspended at ack time, the owning context is already gone and the fault is stale.
Take a runtime PM reference across the entire pagefault queue worker to safely deliver acks for torn-down VMs.
v3: - Move PM ref to the generic xe_pagefault_queue_work using guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe) instead of tracking it in the GuC backend(Matt Brost).
v2: - Hold PM ref across the entire batch (begin/end) instead of per-ack. This prevents the device from autosuspending mid-batch, which would leave write_only acks written but the end flush skipped, and skip counter++, desyncing the cadence check.(Himal) - Add a comment explaining stale faults.(Himal)
(cherry picked from commit fcc2431d2213dc4d04250c4f1ae87d9c3ae0d455) [Rodrigo: Added xe_device struct for compatibility while cherry-picking]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98391"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T14:17:49Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/xe: Guard page-fault worker with runtime PM check\n\nDuring VM teardown, the VM\u0027s runtime PM reference is dropped\nasynchronously, allowing the device to autosuspend while stale page\nfaults belonging to the now-dead VM are still queued. When the\npage-fault worker later tries to ack one of these, it calls into\nguc_ct_send_locked() on an already-suspended device, tripping:\n\n\u00a0 Assertion `!xe_pm_runtime_suspended(xe)` failed!\n\u00a0 WARNING at xe_device.c:1267 xe_device_assert_mem_access+0x11c/0x140 [xe]\n\nA live VM/exec queue always holds a PM reference while it has\noutstanding work, so if the device is suspended at ack time, the\nowning context is already gone and the fault is stale.\n\nTake a runtime PM reference across the entire pagefault\nqueue worker to safely deliver acks for torn-down VMs.\n\nv3:\n - Move PM ref to the generic xe_pagefault_queue_work using\n guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe) instead of tracking it in the GuC\n backend(Matt Brost).\n\nv2:\n - Hold PM ref across the entire batch (begin/end) instead of per-ack.\n This prevents the device from autosuspending mid-batch, which would\n leave write_only acks written but the end flush skipped, and skip\n counter++, desyncing the cadence check.(Himal)\n - Add a comment explaining stale faults.(Himal)\n\n(cherry picked from commit fcc2431d2213dc4d04250c4f1ae87d9c3ae0d455)\n[Rodrigo: Added xe_device struct for compatibility while cherry-picking]",
"id": "GHSA-v93p-6w5h-wmxx",
"modified": "2026-10-14T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2026-10-14T15:32:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20fce5b34b21a995839743b4917a1edd2fd503ba"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25764620ec64c0142e2c87c41787f45540cf09ff"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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