GHSA-V8RF-QJ3W-FQ5C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-19 15:30 – Updated: 2024-10-31 15:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: use latest_dev in btrfs_show_devname

The test case btrfs/238 reports the warning below:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 481 at fs/btrfs/super.c:2509 btrfs_show_devname+0x104/0x1e8 [btrfs] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G W O 5.14.0-rc1-custom #72 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call trace: btrfs_show_devname+0x108/0x1b4 [btrfs] show_mountinfo+0x234/0x2c4 m_show+0x28/0x34 seq_read_iter+0x12c/0x3c4 vfs_read+0x29c/0x2c8 ksys_read+0x80/0xec __arm64_sys_read+0x28/0x34 invoke_syscall+0x50/0xf8 do_el0_svc+0x88/0x138 el0_svc+0x2c/0x8c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c

Reason: While btrfs_prepare_sprout() moves the fs_devices::devices into fs_devices::seed_list, the btrfs_show_devname() searches for the devices and found none, leading to the warning as in above.

Fix: latest_dev is updated according to the changes to the device list. That means we could use the latest_dev->name to show the device name in /proc/self/mounts, the pointer will be always valid as it's assigned before the device is deleted from the list in remove or replace. The RCU protection is sufficient as the device structure is freed after synchronization.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47599"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-19T15:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: use latest_dev in btrfs_show_devname\n\nThe test case btrfs/238 reports the warning below:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 481 at fs/btrfs/super.c:2509 btrfs_show_devname+0x104/0x1e8 [btrfs]\n CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G        W  O 5.14.0-rc1-custom #72\n Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n Call trace:\n   btrfs_show_devname+0x108/0x1b4 [btrfs]\n   show_mountinfo+0x234/0x2c4\n   m_show+0x28/0x34\n   seq_read_iter+0x12c/0x3c4\n   vfs_read+0x29c/0x2c8\n   ksys_read+0x80/0xec\n   __arm64_sys_read+0x28/0x34\n   invoke_syscall+0x50/0xf8\n   do_el0_svc+0x88/0x138\n   el0_svc+0x2c/0x8c\n   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4\n   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c\n\nReason:\nWhile btrfs_prepare_sprout() moves the fs_devices::devices into\nfs_devices::seed_list, the btrfs_show_devname() searches for the devices\nand found none, leading to the warning as in above.\n\nFix:\nlatest_dev is updated according to the changes to the device list.\nThat means we could use the latest_dev-\u003ename to show the device name in\n/proc/self/mounts, the pointer will be always valid as it\u0027s assigned\nbefore the device is deleted from the list in remove or replace.\nThe RCU protection is sufficient as the device structure is freed after\nsynchronization.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8rf-qj3w-fq5c",
  "modified": "2024-10-31T15:30:58Z",
  "published": "2024-06-19T15:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47599"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6605fd2f394bba0a0059df2b6cfc87b0b6d393a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e342c2558016ead462f376b6c6c2ac5efc17f3b1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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