GHSA-V8P2-PX2J-H8F2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xen-blkfront: unbind irq before tearing down ring and shadow requests

In blkif_free_ring(), the driver tears down the ring's persistent grants, shadow request arrays, and shared ring structure (xenbus_teardown_ring), and only calls unbind_from_irqhandler() at the very end.

While blkif_free_ring() is freeing persistent grants and clearing the shadow array, the event channel interrupt (blkif_interrupt) is still registered and active. If an interrupt arrives from the backend during this teardown window, blkif_interrupt() reads rinfo->ring.sring and, via blkif_completion(), accesses rinfo->shadow[id].grants_used and rinfo->shadow[id].sg. blkif_free_ring() tears these structures down without holding rinfo->ring_lock, and the handler only checks info->connected at entry, so this is a real race resulting in a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference.

Fix this by moving unbind_from_irqhandler() to the beginning of blkif_free_ring(). Calling unbind_from_irqhandler() first frees the IRQ and synchronizes with any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs before ring memory and shadow request structures are deallocated, matching the teardown order in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99453"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:59Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxen-blkfront: unbind irq before tearing down ring and shadow requests\n\nIn blkif_free_ring(), the driver tears down the ring\u0027s persistent grants,\nshadow request arrays, and shared ring structure (xenbus_teardown_ring),\nand only calls unbind_from_irqhandler() at the very end.\n\nWhile blkif_free_ring() is freeing persistent grants and clearing the\nshadow array, the event channel interrupt (blkif_interrupt) is still\nregistered and active.  If an interrupt arrives from the backend during\nthis teardown window, blkif_interrupt() reads rinfo-\u003ering.sring and,\nvia blkif_completion(), accesses rinfo-\u003eshadow[id].grants_used and\nrinfo-\u003eshadow[id].sg.  blkif_free_ring() tears these structures down\nwithout holding rinfo-\u003ering_lock, and the handler only checks\ninfo-\u003econnected at entry, so this is a real race resulting in a\nuse-after-free or NULL pointer dereference.\n\nFix this by moving unbind_from_irqhandler() to the beginning of\nblkif_free_ring().  Calling unbind_from_irqhandler() first frees the\nIRQ and synchronizes with any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs\nbefore ring memory and shadow request structures are deallocated,\nmatching the teardown order in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8p2-px2j-h8f2",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99453"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f4b2debc87b6f86b56c6e1f5d97007a330d6aac"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cdf4fae8fde297ed9ce6bb0058d25449606ee66"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e64707d07fcda07c71d4f1405c1bedb0787a6889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3e27b7955727a4d7c0e9264a2a209fbba788bdc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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