GHSA-V84X-QVHG-F36R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 16:52 – Updated: 2026-07-15 16:52MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the admin "Manage Configuration" feature (adm_config_set.php). When setting a configuration value with a non-string type (integer, float, complex), the value is passed through ConfigParser -> Tokenizer, which calls eval() with a return; prefix intended to prevent code execution.
However, PHP hoists function and class declarations at compile time, even past a return statement. An attacker can define a class in the eval()'d code that hijacks a class loaded later via PHP's autoloader, achieving arbitrary code execution.
This vulnerability requires administrator access to the web UI (adm_config_set.php). The REST API's ConfigsSetCommand does NOT use Tokenizer/eval() and is not affected.
Impact
- Remote code execution as the web server user (www-data) from an authenticated administrator session
Patches
- https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/78c0af63d1fe0118004744cab21ca3bf2cea0f5c
Workarounds
None.
Resources
- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37122
Credits
McCaulay Hudson (@_McCaulay) of watchTowr
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.28.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.28.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49273"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-95"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T16:52:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the admin \"Manage Configuration\" feature (adm_config_set.php). When setting a configuration value with a non-string type (integer, float, complex), the value is passed through ConfigParser -\u003e Tokenizer, which calls *eval()* with a `return;` prefix intended to prevent code execution.\n\nHowever, PHP hoists function and class declarations at compile time, even past a *return* statement. An attacker can define a class in the eval()\u0027d code that hijacks a class loaded later via PHP\u0027s autoloader, achieving arbitrary code execution.\n\nThis vulnerability requires administrator access to the web UI (adm_config_set.php). The REST API\u0027s ConfigsSetCommand does NOT use Tokenizer/eval() and is not affected.\n\n### Impact\n- Remote code execution as the web server user (www-data) from an authenticated administrator session\n\n### Patches\n- https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/78c0af63d1fe0118004744cab21ca3bf2cea0f5c\n\n### Workarounds\nNone. \n\n### Resources\n- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37122\n\n### Credits\nMcCaulay Hudson (@_McCaulay) of watchTowr",
"id": "GHSA-v84x-qvhg-f36r",
"modified": "2026-07-15T16:52:24Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T16:52:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-v84x-qvhg-f36r"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/78c0af63d1fe0118004744cab21ca3bf2cea0f5c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37122"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MantisBT: Remote Code Execution via eval() Class Hoisting in adm_config_set.php"
}
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