GHSA-V787-C3F2-P88R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-08 06:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

posix-clock: Fix missing timespec64 check in pc_clock_settime()

As Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core checked timespec64 struct's tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling ptp->info->settime64().

As the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or tp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL, which include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is consistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid() only check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is in a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict() in pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid.

There are some drivers that use tp->tv_sec and tp->tv_nsec directly to write registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer has checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as hclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(), and some drivers can remove the checks of itself.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-50195"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-08T06:15:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nposix-clock: Fix missing timespec64 check in pc_clock_settime()\n\nAs Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core\nchecked timespec64 struct\u0027s tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling\nptp-\u003einfo-\u003esettime64().\n\nAs the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or\ntp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL,\nwhich include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is\nconsistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid()\nonly check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is\nin a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict()\nin pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid.\n\nThere are some drivers that use tp-\u003etv_sec and tp-\u003etv_nsec directly to\nwrite registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer\nhas checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as\nhclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(),\nand some drivers can remove the checks of itself.",
  "id": "GHSA-v787-c3f2-p88r",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:57Z",
  "published": "2024-11-08T06:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ff7247101af723731ea42ed565d54fb8f341264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27abbde44b6e71ee3891de13e1a228aa7ce95bfe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29f085345cde24566efb751f39e5d367c381c584"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/673a1c5a2998acbd429d6286e6cad10f17f4f073"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f169e398215e71361774d13bf91a0101283ac2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8789fbe2bbf75845e45302cba6ffa44e1884d01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8794ac20a299b647ba9958f6d657051fc51a540"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0c966bd3e31911b57ef76cec4c5796ebd88e512"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00002.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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