GHSA-V5JV-J5CW-GGJQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate usa_ofs before preserving the update sequence number
When ntfs_mft_record_alloc() reuses a free mft record it reads the old update sequence number straight from the on-disk record:
usn = *(__le16 *)((u8 *)m + le16_to_cpu(m->usa_ofs));
Here m points into the raw $MFT page-cache folio, which still holds unvalidated, MST-protected bytes: the folio is read by a plain iomap_read_folio() and neither post_read_mst_fixup() nor ntfs_mft_record_check() has run on it (both work on private copies). m->usa_ofs is therefore an untrusted u16, and a corrupted record can put it past the end of the record so the two-byte read lands outside the folio. Reading such a record while creating a file gives, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_mft_record_alloc+... Read of size 2 at addr ... ntfs_mft_record_alloc -> __ntfs_create -> ntfs_create -> path_openat
Only preserve the old update sequence number when usa_ofs is even and in range, mirroring the check ntfs_mft_record_check() already applies; otherwise leave usn zero, which the existing restore below skips.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90117"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate usa_ofs before preserving the update sequence number\n\nWhen ntfs_mft_record_alloc() reuses a free mft record it reads the old\nupdate sequence number straight from the on-disk record:\n\n usn = *(__le16 *)((u8 *)m + le16_to_cpu(m-\u003eusa_ofs));\n\nHere m points into the raw $MFT page-cache folio, which still holds\nunvalidated, MST-protected bytes: the folio is read by a plain\niomap_read_folio() and neither post_read_mst_fixup() nor\nntfs_mft_record_check() has run on it (both work on private copies).\nm-\u003eusa_ofs is therefore an untrusted u16, and a corrupted record can put\nit past the end of the record so the two-byte read lands outside the\nfolio. Reading such a record while creating a file gives, under KASAN:\n\n BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_mft_record_alloc+...\n Read of size 2 at addr ...\n ntfs_mft_record_alloc -\u003e __ntfs_create -\u003e ntfs_create -\u003e path_openat\n\nOnly preserve the old update sequence number when usa_ofs is even and in\nrange, mirroring the check ntfs_mft_record_check() already applies;\notherwise leave usn zero, which the existing restore below skips.",
"id": "GHSA-v5jv-j5cw-ggjq",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:51Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81684340963da2e898eabb8c1e274433d9375bc6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea5a3c30710710c1dc5e483d3313309ec2e868f7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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