GHSA-V56G-44RC-67WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-15 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md raid: fix hang when stopping arrays with metadata through dm-raid

When using device-mapper's dm-raid target, stopping a RAID array can cause the system to hang under specific conditions.

This occurs when:

  • A dm-raid managed device tree is suspended from top to bottom (the top-level RAID device is suspended first, followed by its underlying metadata and data devices)

  • The top-level RAID device is then removed

Removing the top-level device triggers a hang in the following sequence: the dm-raid destructor calls md_stop(), which tries to flush the write-intent bitmap by writing to the metadata sub-devices. However, these devices are already suspended, making them unable to complete the write-intent operations and causing an indefinite block.

Fix:

  • Prevent bitmap flushing when md_stop() is called from dm-raid destructor context and avoid a quiescing/unquescing cycle which could also cause I/O

  • Still allow write-intent bitmap flushing when called from dm-raid suspend context

This ensures that RAID array teardown can complete successfully even when the underlying devices are in a suspended state.

This second patch uses md_is_rdwr() to distinguish between suspend and destructor paths as elaborated on above.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43309"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmd raid: fix hang when stopping arrays with metadata through dm-raid\n\nWhen using device-mapper\u0027s dm-raid target, stopping a RAID array can cause\nthe system to hang under specific conditions.\n\nThis occurs when:\n\n- A dm-raid managed device tree is suspended from top to bottom\n   (the top-level RAID device is suspended first, followed by its\n    underlying metadata and data devices)\n\n- The top-level RAID device is then removed\n\nRemoving the top-level device triggers a hang in the following sequence:\nthe dm-raid destructor calls md_stop(), which tries to flush the\nwrite-intent bitmap by writing to the metadata sub-devices. However, these\ndevices are already suspended, making them unable to complete the write-intent\noperations and causing an indefinite block.\n\nFix:\n\n- Prevent bitmap flushing when md_stop() is called from dm-raid\ndestructor context\n  and avoid a quiescing/unquescing cycle which could also cause I/O\n\n- Still allow write-intent bitmap flushing when called from dm-raid\nsuspend context\n\nThis ensures that RAID array teardown can complete successfully even when the\nunderlying devices are in a suspended state.\n\nThis second patch uses md_is_rdwr() to distinguish between suspend and\ndestructor paths as elaborated on above.",
  "id": "GHSA-v56g-44rc-67wq",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T18:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24783dd06de870d646c25207bae186f78195f912"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/338378dfffbdbb8d37a18f0a0c0358812671f91e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefcb9297fbdb6d94b61787b4f8d84f55b741470"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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