GHSA-V395-X24J-4R3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-19 00:31SQL injection in pgAdmin 4's named restore point endpoint (POST /browser/server/restore_point/{gid}/{sid}). The user-supplied 'value' field was interpolated directly into the SQL string with str.format() instead of being passed as a bound parameter, allowing an authenticated pgAdmin user with a connected PostgreSQL session to inject additional statements through that endpoint.
The injected SQL executes under the database role the user is already authenticated as. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through the Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants them. The marginal impact accounts for the fact that the injection path is not the documented SQL-execution interface, so a deployment that gates the Query Tool at the application layer could see SQL executed through a path it did not anticipate.
Fix passes the restore point name as a bound parameter and schema-qualifies the function call as pg_catalog.pg_create_restore_point so a non-default search_path on the connection cannot redirect the call to a shadow definition. A regression test asserts the value arrives as a bound parameter and not spliced into the SQL string.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12050"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T00:16:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SQL injection in pgAdmin 4\u0027s named restore point endpoint (POST /browser/server/restore_point/{gid}/{sid}). The user-supplied \u0027value\u0027 field was interpolated directly into the SQL string with str.format() instead of being passed as a bound parameter, allowing an authenticated pgAdmin user with a connected PostgreSQL session to inject additional statements through that endpoint.\n\nThe injected SQL executes under the database role the user is already authenticated as. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through the Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants them. The marginal impact accounts for the fact that the injection path is not the documented SQL-execution interface, so a deployment that gates the Query Tool at the application layer could see SQL executed through a path it did not anticipate.\n\nFix passes the restore point name as a bound parameter and schema-qualifies the function call as pg_catalog.pg_create_restore_point so a non-default search_path on the connection cannot redirect the call to a shadow definition. A regression test asserts the value arrives as a bound parameter and not spliced into the SQL string.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.",
"id": "GHSA-v395-x24j-4r3g",
"modified": "2026-06-19T00:31:38Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T00:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12050"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/3379c39865d3ab6f52afce97361fb16bcdd77cd2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.