GHSA-RW23-9H76-PF6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: skip non-present PMDs when queueing folios
Patch series "mm: handle device-private PMDs in walk callbacks", v3.
Since commit 368076f52ebe ("mm/huge_memory: add device-private THP support to PMD operations") a PMD may hold a device-private swap entry whenever an HMM-based GPU driver migrates an anonymous THP folio to device memory via migrate_vma_pages().
pmd_trans_huge_lock() succeeds for such PMDs (pmd_is_huge() returns true for any non-present, non-none huge PMD), so several MM walk callbacks that used to assume present THP or migration entry are now reachable with a device-private PMD. The results range from a VM_BUG_ON() firing on debug kernels, to an oops on a bogus vmemmap dereference, to silently isolating an unrelated live folio from LRU in the aliasing case.
This patch (of 3):
queue_folios_pmd() is called under pmd_trans_huge_lock(), whose pmd_is_huge() check returns true for any non-present, non-none PMD softleaf. Passing such a PMD to pmd_folio() treats the softleaf encoding as a hardware PFN and can return a bogus folio pointer.
Mirror queue_folios_pte_range(): handle non-present entries before looking up a folio. Keep migration entries counted as failures, but skip other non-present PMDs such as device-private entries.
Potential trigger: an HMM-based GPU driver migrates an anonymous THP folio to device memory via migrate_vma_pages(), leaving a device-private PMD. Userspace then calls mbind(), migrate_pages() or set_mempolicy_home_node() on that range.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89758"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:20:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/mempolicy: skip non-present PMDs when queueing folios\n\nPatch series \"mm: handle device-private PMDs in walk callbacks\", v3.\n\nSince commit 368076f52ebe (\"mm/huge_memory: add device-private THP support\nto PMD operations\") a PMD may hold a device-private swap entry whenever an\nHMM-based GPU driver migrates an anonymous THP folio to device memory via\nmigrate_vma_pages().\n\npmd_trans_huge_lock() succeeds for such PMDs (pmd_is_huge() returns true\nfor any non-present, non-none huge PMD), so several MM walk callbacks that\nused to assume present THP or migration entry are now reachable with a\ndevice-private PMD. The results range from a VM_BUG_ON() firing on debug\nkernels, to an oops on a bogus vmemmap dereference, to silently isolating\nan unrelated live folio from LRU in the aliasing case.\n\n\nThis patch (of 3):\n\nqueue_folios_pmd() is called under pmd_trans_huge_lock(), whose\npmd_is_huge() check returns true for any non-present, non-none PMD\nsoftleaf. Passing such a PMD to pmd_folio() treats the softleaf encoding\nas a hardware PFN and can return a bogus folio pointer.\n\nMirror queue_folios_pte_range(): handle non-present entries before looking\nup a folio. Keep migration entries counted as failures, but skip other\nnon-present PMDs such as device-private entries.\n\nPotential trigger: an HMM-based GPU driver migrates an anonymous THP folio\nto device memory via migrate_vma_pages(), leaving a device-private PMD. \nUserspace then calls mbind(), migrate_pages() or set_mempolicy_home_node()\non that range.",
"id": "GHSA-rw23-9h76-pf6x",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2858b4027f491e6fdb8ee2d8923798b619bf2791"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d927093b2add7ced588a926c3dc5d7a83f18596"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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