GHSA-RVP5-9P55-F5RP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:00 – Updated: 2026-06-05 16:00
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: Open Redirect via Hash Fragment in hashRedirect Plugin
Details

Summary

The client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith('/'). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link such as https://nocodb.example/#//attacker.com/phishing silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin.

Details

In packages/nc-gui/plugins/hashRedirect.client.ts, the plugin extracted the hash content and normalised it into cleanUrl:

let cleanUrl = hashPath.startsWith('/') ? hashPath : `/${hashPath}`
if (hashQuery) cleanUrl += `?${hashQuery}`
window.location.replace(cleanUrl)

startsWith('/') returns true for //attacker.com/..., which browsers interpret as a protocol-relative absolute URL. No hostname check was performed before the redirect. The fix adds an early if (/^\/[/\\]/.test(hashPath)) return to reject protocol-relative paths.

Impact

  • Open redirect from any NocoDB origin to an attacker-controlled domain.
  • No authentication required; the attack lands the victim on an attacker-controlled page that may impersonate a NocoDB login.

Credit

This issue was reported by @fg0x0.

Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.04.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47377"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:00:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe client-side `hashRedirect` plugin called `window.location.replace()` on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking `hashPath.startsWith(\u0027/\u0027)`. Protocol-relative URLs (`//attacker.com/\u2026`) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link such as `https://nocodb.example/#//attacker.com/phishing` silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `packages/nc-gui/plugins/hashRedirect.client.ts`, the plugin extracted the hash content and normalised it into `cleanUrl`:\n\n```ts\nlet cleanUrl = hashPath.startsWith(\u0027/\u0027) ? hashPath : `/${hashPath}`\nif (hashQuery) cleanUrl += `?${hashQuery}`\nwindow.location.replace(cleanUrl)\n```\n\n`startsWith(\u0027/\u0027)` returns true for `//attacker.com/...`, which browsers interpret as a protocol-relative absolute URL. No hostname check was performed before the redirect. The fix adds an early `if (/^\\/[/\\\\]/.test(hashPath)) return` to reject protocol-relative paths.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Open redirect from any NocoDB origin to an attacker-controlled domain.\n- No authentication required; the attack lands the victim on an attacker-controlled page that may impersonate a NocoDB login.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@fg0x0](https://github.com/fg0x0).",
  "id": "GHSA-rvp5-9p55-f5rp",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T16:00:15Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T16:00:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-rvp5-9p55-f5rp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.04.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: Open Redirect via Hash Fragment in hashRedirect Plugin"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.