GHSA-RV89-WCH8-C574
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 20:29 – Updated: 2026-06-22 20:29Summary
The email update functionality fails to invalidate the existing verification state when a user changes their email address, allowing a verified account to retain its verified status after switching to an unverified or unowned email address.
Technical Details
When a user updated their email address, the system did not reset or revalidate the associated email verification status. As a result, the verification column remained set to “true” even after the email address was changed.
This allowed an attacker to:
- Verify an account using a legitimate email address
- Change the account email to an arbitrary or unowned address
- Retain the verified status without re-confirmation of the new email
No verification challenge or confirmation was required for the newly assigned email address.
Impact
This vulnerability allows a user to associate a verified account with an email address they do not control, this may result in:
- Misrepresentation of email ownership
- Bypass of verification-based trust assumptions
- Potential abuse of features gated behind verified status
No direct unauthorized access to other users accounts or data is possible through this issue alone.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "paymenter/paymenter"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44584"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T20:29:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe email update functionality fails to invalidate the existing verification state when a user changes their email address, allowing a verified account to retain its verified status after switching to an unverified or unowned email address.\n\n### Technical Details\nWhen a user updated their email address, the system did not reset or revalidate the associated email verification status. As a result, the verification column remained set to \u201ctrue\u201d even after the email address was changed.\n\nThis allowed an attacker to:\n\n- Verify an account using a legitimate email address\n- Change the account email to an arbitrary or unowned address\n- Retain the verified status without re-confirmation of the new email\n\nNo verification challenge or confirmation was required for the newly assigned email address.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows a user to associate a verified account with an email address they do not control, this may result in:\n\n- Misrepresentation of email ownership\n- Bypass of verification-based trust assumptions\n- Potential abuse of features gated behind verified status\n\nNo direct unauthorized access to other users accounts or data is possible through this issue alone.",
"id": "GHSA-rv89-wch8-c574",
"modified": "2026-06-22T20:29:41Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T20:29:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter/security/advisories/GHSA-rv89-wch8-c574"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Paymenter doesn\u0027t reset email verification status after email change"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.