GHSA-RV5X-862J-Q6F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-01 06:31 – Updated: 2025-12-23 03:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: vmk80xx: fix incomplete endpoint checking
While vmk80xx does have endpoint checking implemented, some things can fall through the cracks. Depending on the hardware model, URBs can have either bulk or interrupt type, and current version of vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints() function does not take that fully into account. While this warning does not seem to be too harmful, at the very least it will crash systems with 'panic_on_warn' set on them.
Fix the issue found by Syzkaller [1] by somewhat simplifying the endpoint checking process with usb_find_common_endpoints() and ensuring that only expected endpoint types are present.
This patch has not been tested on real hardware.
[1] Syzkaller report: usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 781 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xc4e/0x18c0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503 ... Call Trace: usb_start_wait_urb+0x113/0x520 drivers/usb/core/message.c:59 vmk80xx_reset_device drivers/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c:227 [inline] vmk80xx_auto_attach+0xa1c/0x1a40 drivers/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c:818 comedi_auto_config+0x238/0x380 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:1067 usb_probe_interface+0x5cd/0xb00 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399 ...
Similar issue also found by Syzkaller:
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27001"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-01T06:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncomedi: vmk80xx: fix incomplete endpoint checking\n\nWhile vmk80xx does have endpoint checking implemented, some things\ncan fall through the cracks. Depending on the hardware model,\nURBs can have either bulk or interrupt type, and current version\nof vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints() function does not take that fully\ninto account. While this warning does not seem to be too harmful,\nat the very least it will crash systems with \u0027panic_on_warn\u0027 set on\nthem.\n\nFix the issue found by Syzkaller [1] by somewhat simplifying the\nendpoint checking process with usb_find_common_endpoints() and\nensuring that only expected endpoint types are present.\n\nThis patch has not been tested on real hardware.\n\n[1] Syzkaller report:\nusb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 781 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xc4e/0x18c0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:503\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n usb_start_wait_urb+0x113/0x520 drivers/usb/core/message.c:59\n vmk80xx_reset_device drivers/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c:227 [inline]\n vmk80xx_auto_attach+0xa1c/0x1a40 drivers/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c:818\n comedi_auto_config+0x238/0x380 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:1067\n usb_probe_interface+0x5cd/0xb00 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399\n...\n\nSimilar issue also found by Syzkaller:",
"id": "GHSA-rv5x-862j-q6f6",
"modified": "2025-12-23T03:30:18Z",
"published": "2024-05-01T06:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a63ae0348d990e137cca04eced5b08379969ea9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59f33af9796160f851641d960bd93937f282c696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ec3514a7d35ad9cfab600187612c29f669069d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3b8ae7e9297dd453f2977b011c5bc75eb20e71b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac882d6b21bffecb57bcc4486701239eef5aa67b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0b268eeb087e324ef3ea71f8e6cabd07630517f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1718530e3f640b7d5f0050e725216eab57a85d8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f15370e315976198f338b41611f37ce82af6cf54"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4EZ6PJW7VOZ224TD7N4JZNU6KV32ZJ53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DAMSOZXJEPUOXW33WZYWCVAY7Z5S7OOY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GCBZZEC7L7KTWWAS2NLJK6SO3IZIL4WW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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