GHSA-RRV7-JQJ6-X46G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-18 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet: fix heap out-of-bounds read in nvmet_auth_negotiate()

nvmet_execute_auth_send() allocates the DH-HMAC-CHAP message buffer with the host-supplied transfer length (tl) and hands it to nvmet_auth_negotiate() without passing tl along. nvmet_auth_negotiate() then reads the negotiate header and, for each of the halen hash identifiers and dhlen DH group identifiers, indexes into the fixed idlist[60] array (hashes at idlist[0..halen), groups at idlist[30..]).

Neither the transfer length nor halen/dhlen is validated. A malicious or non-conformant host can report a tl smaller than the negotiate structure, or a halen/dhlen larger than the array (both are u8, up to 255), making the loops read past the end of the allocated buffer (heap out-of-bounds read). The sibling nvmet_auth_reply() already validates tl against the structure size; the negotiate path did not.

Pass tl into nvmet_auth_negotiate(), reject a tl that does not cover the negotiate data plus one full protocol descriptor, and reject halen/dhlen larger than NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MAX_DH_IDS.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90230"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:18Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet: fix heap out-of-bounds read in nvmet_auth_negotiate()\n\nnvmet_execute_auth_send() allocates the DH-HMAC-CHAP message buffer with\nthe host-supplied transfer length (tl) and hands it to\nnvmet_auth_negotiate() without passing tl along. nvmet_auth_negotiate()\nthen reads the negotiate header and, for each of the halen hash\nidentifiers and dhlen DH group identifiers, indexes into the fixed\nidlist[60] array (hashes at idlist[0..halen), groups at idlist[30..]).\n\nNeither the transfer length nor halen/dhlen is validated. A malicious or\nnon-conformant host can report a tl smaller than the negotiate structure,\nor a halen/dhlen larger than the array (both are u8, up to 255), making\nthe loops read past the end of the allocated buffer (heap out-of-bounds\nread). The sibling nvmet_auth_reply() already validates tl against the\nstructure size; the negotiate path did not.\n\nPass tl into nvmet_auth_negotiate(), reject a tl that does not cover the\nnegotiate data plus one full protocol descriptor, and reject halen/dhlen\nlarger than NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MAX_DH_IDS.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrv7-jqj6-x46g",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T18:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bb96cc218835769ab74ec7f3ea2bf81fbffe955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b81e4d2230e3d2d372c826180c4ef0efc244f31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89ff11b72f38976f3b5aea23a5228ee05e277209"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaac783950b17c57df9b6f7344747cacb1a407ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c38a8186326799957d293d370136c128cd113916"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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