GHSA-RR49-F9G6-C9R5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 13:55 – Updated: 2026-09-23 13:55
VLAI
Summary
plone.app.portlets Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via TALES Injection
Details

Impact

The Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.

This is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.

Patches

The problem has been patched in plone.app.portlets

  • For Plone 6.2, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 7.0.2.
  • For Plone 6.1, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 6.0.4.
  • For Plone 6.0, upgrade to plone.app.portlets 5.0.8.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

  • Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to trusted administrators (usually this is already restricted to the Manager and Site Administrator roles).
  • Where the Classic portlet is not needed, unregister it so it cannot be added. This would need to be done by editing a portlets.xml in your own code, so it is not a quick fix.
  • You could also effectively disable showing the classic portlet by customising its template. In the Zope Management Interface go to the portal_view_customizations tool, locate the classic.pt template and click it. Click the Customize button. Remove all text and replace it with <div>The classic portlet was disabled.</div>. (This is not a recommended way of customising a template, but in this case it is quite effective.)

Credits

Discovered by Giuseppe Caruso, and reported to the Plone/Zope Security Team. Thanks!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "plone.app.portlets"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "plone.app.portlets"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "plone.app.portlets"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T13:55:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T19:16:43Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to trusted administrators (usually this is already restricted to the Manager and Site Administrator roles).\n- Where the Classic portlet is not needed, unregister it so it cannot be added. This would need to be done by editing a `portlets.xml` in your own code, so it is not a quick fix.\n- You could also effectively disable showing the classic portlet by customising its template. In the Zope Management Interface go to the `portal_view_customizations` tool, locate the `classic.pt` template and click it. Click the Customize button.  Remove all text and replace it with `\u003cdiv\u003eThe classic portlet was disabled.\u003c/div\u003e`. (This is not a recommended way of customising a template, but in this case it is quite effective.)\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered by Giuseppe Caruso, and reported to the [Plone/Zope Security Team](mailto:security@plone.org). Thanks!",
  "id": "GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5",
  "modified": "2026-09-23T13:55:47Z",
  "published": "2026-09-23T13:55:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/security/advisories/GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/commit/1d9cacacfad9ed08b890dadc6e75741e295dc151"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/commit/8a0641dc4054a2b13834bba00c67cd9a2fd189e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/commit/fb979f01b57dd2fc06c90ee6577eb5eb285da8f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/releases/tag/5.0.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/releases/tag/6.0.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.portlets/releases/tag/7.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "plone.app.portlets Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via TALES Injection"
}



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