GHSA-RQM8-Q8J9-662F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-14 15:30 – Updated: 2023-03-17 16:59Summary
A vulnerability was identified in Nomad and Nomad Enterprise (“Nomad”) such that a user with the submit-job ACL capability can submit a job that can escalate to management-level privileges. This vulnerability, CVE-2023-1299, was introduced in Nomad 1.5.0 and fixed in Nomad 1.5.1.
Background
Nomad 1.4.0 introduced the concept of workload identity so that tasks can access variables without needing to access them through Nomad HTTP API with an ACL token.
In 1.5.0, the identity block was introduced, which exposes the workload identity token to the workload so it can access Nomad HTTP API via a unix domain socket without configuring mTLS.
Details
During internal testing, we discovered it was possible to abuse the workload identity to elevate to management-level privilege if the workload identity did not have any attached ACL policies.
Remediation
Customers should evaluate the risk associated with this issue and consider upgrading to Nomad 1.5.1 or newer. See Nomad’s Upgrading for general guidance on this process.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/nomad"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.5.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-1299"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-14T18:02:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-14T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA vulnerability was identified in Nomad and Nomad Enterprise (\u201cNomad\u201d) such that a user with the submit-job ACL capability can submit a job that can escalate to management-level privileges. This vulnerability, CVE-2023-1299, was introduced in Nomad 1.5.0 and fixed in Nomad 1.5.1.\n\n### Background\nNomad 1.4.0 introduced the concept of workload identity so that tasks can access variables without needing to access them through Nomad HTTP API with an ACL token.\n\nIn 1.5.0, the identity block was introduced, which exposes the workload identity token to the workload so it can access Nomad HTTP API via a unix domain socket without configuring mTLS.\n\n### Details\nDuring internal testing, we discovered it was possible to abuse the workload identity to elevate to management-level privilege if the workload identity did not have any attached ACL policies.\n\n### Remediation\nCustomers should evaluate the risk associated with this issue and consider upgrading to Nomad 1.5.1 or newer. See Nomad\u2019s Upgrading for general guidance on this process.",
"id": "GHSA-rqm8-q8j9-662f",
"modified": "2023-03-17T16:59:18Z",
"published": "2023-03-14T15:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2023-08-nomad-job-submitter-privilege-escalation-using-workload-identity/51389"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nomad Job Submitter Privilege Escalation Using Workload Identity"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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