GHSA-RQ55-PFF5-XW57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rtl2832_sdr: release URBs and stream buffers on start_streaming() failure
rtl2832_sdr_start_streaming() calls rtl2832_sdr_alloc_stream_bufs(), rtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() and rtl2832_sdr_submit_urbs() in sequence and shares a single err: label that only unlocks the mutex and returns. When alloc_urbs() succeeds but submit_urbs() fails, or when alloc_urbs() itself returns -ENOMEM after alloc_stream_bufs() has already succeeded, the URBs and/or the coherent DMA stream buffers stay allocated while streaming reports failure to vb2. Two latent defects follow on the next VIDIOC_STREAMON:
1) rtl2832_sdr_alloc_stream_bufs() unconditionally resets dev->buf_num to 0 and overwrites dev->buf_list[]/dev->dma_addr[], permanently leaking the coherent DMA memory allocated by the previous attempt.
2) rtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() never resets dev->urbs_initialized and only increments it. After a second successful pass urbs_initialized can exceed MAX_BULK_BUFS, so the subsequent rtl2832_sdr_free_urbs() walks from urbs_initialized - 1 down to 0 and reads past the end of dev->urb_list[], passing garbage pointers to usb_free_urb().
Mirror the teardown that stop_streaming() already performs: on the error path call rtl2832_sdr_free_urbs() and rtl2832_sdr_free_stream_bufs() before unlocking. Both helpers are idempotent (free_urbs kills and zeros urbs_initialized; free_stream_bufs is gated on URB_BUF and clears the buf_num counter), so partial-failure paths and the no-allocation paths remain safe.
Issue identified by automated review of the INV-003 series at https://sashiko.dev/
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89880"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: rtl2832_sdr: release URBs and stream buffers on start_streaming() failure\n\nrtl2832_sdr_start_streaming() calls rtl2832_sdr_alloc_stream_bufs(),\nrtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() and rtl2832_sdr_submit_urbs() in sequence and\nshares a single err: label that only unlocks the mutex and returns.\nWhen alloc_urbs() succeeds but submit_urbs() fails, or when alloc_urbs()\nitself returns -ENOMEM after alloc_stream_bufs() has already succeeded,\nthe URBs and/or the coherent DMA stream buffers stay allocated while\nstreaming reports failure to vb2. Two latent defects follow on the next\nVIDIOC_STREAMON:\n\n1) rtl2832_sdr_alloc_stream_bufs() unconditionally resets dev-\u003ebuf_num\n to 0 and overwrites dev-\u003ebuf_list[]/dev-\u003edma_addr[], permanently\n leaking the coherent DMA memory allocated by the previous attempt.\n\n2) rtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() never resets dev-\u003eurbs_initialized and only\n increments it. After a second successful pass urbs_initialized can\n exceed MAX_BULK_BUFS, so the subsequent rtl2832_sdr_free_urbs() walks\n from urbs_initialized - 1 down to 0 and reads past the end of\n dev-\u003eurb_list[], passing garbage pointers to usb_free_urb().\n\nMirror the teardown that stop_streaming() already performs: on the error\npath call rtl2832_sdr_free_urbs() and rtl2832_sdr_free_stream_bufs()\nbefore unlocking. Both helpers are idempotent (free_urbs kills and zeros\nurbs_initialized; free_stream_bufs is gated on URB_BUF and clears the\nbuf_num counter), so partial-failure paths and the no-allocation paths\nremain safe.\n\nIssue identified by automated review of the INV-003 series at\nhttps://sashiko.dev/",
"id": "GHSA-rq55-pff5-xw57",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0337ab0759285076a3f9dcfcc40906e69ab519b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26a2a985bbeee3eaa6f80ff7de732161a171ec9f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8bcf11a239eac4e224ad856277de9a36c91b1711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac02b2c56ccef0788cea9b86990a8f349a3fc6d8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c819dea3a433ae790b829443fdcc1715d1586560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c91e8ae2b39c6da81f26f2c9877d3fd33a4465ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f14a713a36a5c87568430e9770896f2a8f5bbbb7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe50cdaebf12cd32ff9a44d92bfd6fbc2300dbd4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.