GHSA-RQ3X-GG6J-X3RG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-10 09:32 – Updated: 2025-11-19 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix node corruption in ar->arvifs list
In current WLAN recovery code flow, ath12k_core_halt() only reinitializes the "arvifs" list head. This will cause the list node immediately following the list head to become an invalid list node. Because the prev of that node still points to the list head "arvifs", but the next of the list head "arvifs" no longer points to that list node.
When a WLAN recovery occurs during the execution of a vif removal, and it happens before the spin_lock_bh(&ar->data_lock) in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete(), list_del() will detect the previously mentioned situation, thereby triggering a kernel panic.
The fix is to remove and reinitialize all vif list nodes from the list head "arvifs" during WLAN halt. The reinitialization is to make the list nodes valid, ensuring that the list_del() in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete() can execute normally.
Call trace: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xd4/0x100 (P) ath12k_mac_remove_link_interface.isra.0+0xf8/0x2e4 [ath12k] ath12k_scan_vdev_clean_work+0x40/0x164 [ath12k] cfg80211_wiphy_work+0xfc/0x100 process_one_work+0x164/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0xfc/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The change is mostly copied from the ath11k patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250320053145.3445187-1-quic_stonez@quicinc.com/
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38290"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-10T08:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath12k: fix node corruption in ar-\u003earvifs list\n\nIn current WLAN recovery code flow, ath12k_core_halt() only reinitializes\nthe \"arvifs\" list head. This will cause the list node immediately following\nthe list head to become an invalid list node. Because the prev of that node\nstill points to the list head \"arvifs\", but the next of the list head\n\"arvifs\" no longer points to that list node.\n\nWhen a WLAN recovery occurs during the execution of a vif removal, and it\nhappens before the spin_lock_bh(\u0026ar-\u003edata_lock) in\nath12k_mac_vdev_delete(), list_del() will detect the previously mentioned\nsituation, thereby triggering a kernel panic.\n\nThe fix is to remove and reinitialize all vif list nodes from the list head\n\"arvifs\" during WLAN halt. The reinitialization is to make the list nodes\nvalid, ensuring that the list_del() in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete() can execute\nnormally.\n\nCall trace:\n__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xd4/0x100 (P)\nath12k_mac_remove_link_interface.isra.0+0xf8/0x2e4 [ath12k]\nath12k_scan_vdev_clean_work+0x40/0x164 [ath12k]\ncfg80211_wiphy_work+0xfc/0x100\nprocess_one_work+0x164/0x2d0\nworker_thread+0x254/0x380\nkthread+0xfc/0x100\nret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n\nThe change is mostly copied from the ath11k patch:\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/all/20250320053145.3445187-1-quic_stonez@quicinc.com/\n\nTested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1",
"id": "GHSA-rq3x-gg6j-x3rg",
"modified": "2025-11-19T21:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-07-10T09:32:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38290"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6285516170f9e2f04b9dbf1e5100e0d7cbac22b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bfe7ae9bbd9734751b853e2d2e1c13e8b46fd2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/823435bd23108d6f8be89ea2d025c0e2e3769c51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be049199dec9189602bc06e2c70eda3aa0f2ea6e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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