GHSA-RMC3-723G-FX4M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in ni_create_attr_list()
ni_create_attr_list() allocates a fixed buffer of al_aligned(record_size) (== record_size) bytes and then walks every attribute of the primary MFT record, writing one ATTR_LIST_ENTRY per attribute and advancing the cursor by le_size(name_len), with no check against the end of the buffer; the total size is only computed after the loop.
A minimum-size resident attribute occupies SIZEOF_RESIDENT (0x18 = 24) bytes on disk, but an unnamed attribute expands to le_size(0) (0x20 = 32) bytes in the list. Because the number of attributes in a record is not bounded (mi_enum_attr() accepts arbitrarily many equal-type, nameless minimum-size attributes), a crafted record packed with such attributes produces a list larger than record_size and overflows the heap buffer.
This is reachable from a crafted, loop-mounted NTFS image: opening the file and adding an attribute (e.g. via setxattr) drives ntfs_set_ea() -> ni_insert_resident() -> ni_insert_attr() -> ni_ins_attr_ext() -> ni_create_attr_list().
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0xc48/0x1058 Write of size 4 at addr ffff000008984c00 by task setfattr/345 ni_create_attr_list+0xc48/0x1058 ni_ins_attr_ext+0x510/0x7c0 ni_insert_attr+0x3f8/0x70c ni_insert_resident+0xc8/0x3b0 ntfs_set_ea+0x66c/0xd28 ntfs_setxattr+0x4d8/0x5b0 __arm64_sys_setxattr+0xa4/0x124 Allocated by task 345: ni_create_attr_list+0x188/0x1058 The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 (the write lands at object+1024).
Size the buffer from the actual attributes instead of assuming a single record_size is always enough.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:18Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in ni_create_attr_list()\n\nni_create_attr_list() allocates a fixed buffer of al_aligned(record_size)\n(== record_size) bytes and then walks every attribute of the primary MFT\nrecord, writing one ATTR_LIST_ENTRY per attribute and advancing the cursor\nby le_size(name_len), with no check against the end of the buffer; the\ntotal size is only computed after the loop.\n\nA minimum-size resident attribute occupies SIZEOF_RESIDENT (0x18 = 24)\nbytes on disk, but an unnamed attribute expands to le_size(0) (0x20 = 32)\nbytes in the list. Because the number of attributes in a record is not\nbounded (mi_enum_attr() accepts arbitrarily many equal-type, nameless\nminimum-size attributes), a crafted record packed with such attributes\nproduces a list larger than record_size and overflows the heap buffer.\n\nThis is reachable from a crafted, loop-mounted NTFS image: opening the file\nand adding an attribute (e.g. via setxattr) drives ntfs_set_ea() -\u003e\nni_insert_resident() -\u003e ni_insert_attr() -\u003e ni_ins_attr_ext() -\u003e\nni_create_attr_list().\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0xc48/0x1058\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff000008984c00 by task setfattr/345\n ni_create_attr_list+0xc48/0x1058\n ni_ins_attr_ext+0x510/0x7c0\n ni_insert_attr+0x3f8/0x70c\n ni_insert_resident+0xc8/0x3b0\n ntfs_set_ea+0x66c/0xd28\n ntfs_setxattr+0x4d8/0x5b0\n __arm64_sys_setxattr+0xa4/0x124\n Allocated by task 345:\n ni_create_attr_list+0x188/0x1058\n The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024\n (the write lands at object+1024).\n\nSize the buffer from the actual attributes instead of assuming a single\nrecord_size is always enough.",
"id": "GHSA-rmc3-723g-fx4m",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a38f3c71bcd9bd58d86489c364bd29a4c2c860e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c4841e2a62794a3bab7c1ff0540580f387e377f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e9aee7e4d9767cc3e423b3beecb01c7ebb6bbcd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a84f3db72561c4d9281c5ff721ce46b9ffa7f30e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d07e281f2a7710502985d6f80b95ddac8f4e81d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa2215cf451414b0512cd6f7d37a057893811f4d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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