GHSA-RJXF-MJ66-7HPG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-09 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of sk_protocol in bpf_sock_destroy()
sk_protocol lives in struct sock, not in struct sock_common. A timewait or request sock handed to bpf_sock_destroy() by the tcp iterator is neither, so reading sk->sk_protocol runs past the object:
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881047d11b4 by task test_progs/428
Tainted: [W]=WARN Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 print_report+0xd1/0x630 kasan_report+0xf3/0x130 __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x30 bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0 bpf_prog_c3dd61f9d9cd9f37_iter_tcp6_timewait+0x9f/0xb7 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x538/0xde0 bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x26b/0x4b0 bpf_seq_read+0x424/0x1210 vfs_read+0x197/0xe40 ksys_read+0x119/0x240 __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x647/0x27e0 do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Only check sk_protocol on full socks. tcp_abort() already knows how to deal with TIME_WAIT and NEW_SYN_RECV socks. Also fix the comment, it never matched the code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98384"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-09T08:16:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of sk_protocol in bpf_sock_destroy()\n\nsk_protocol lives in struct sock, not in struct sock_common. A timewait\nor request sock handed to bpf_sock_destroy() by the tcp iterator is\nneither, so reading sk-\u003esk_protocol runs past the object:\n\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0\nRead of size 2 at addr ffff8881047d11b4 by task test_progs/428\n\nTainted: [W]=WARN\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0\n print_report+0xd1/0x630\n kasan_report+0xf3/0x130\n __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x30\n bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0\n bpf_prog_c3dd61f9d9cd9f37_iter_tcp6_timewait+0x9f/0xb7\n bpf_iter_run_prog+0x538/0xde0\n bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x26b/0x4b0\n bpf_seq_read+0x424/0x1210\n vfs_read+0x197/0xe40\n ksys_read+0x119/0x240\n __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0\n x64_sys_call+0x647/0x27e0\n do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nOnly check sk_protocol on full socks. tcp_abort() already knows how to\ndeal with TIME_WAIT and NEW_SYN_RECV socks. Also fix the comment, it\nnever matched the code.",
"id": "GHSA-rjxf-mj66-7hpg",
"modified": "2026-10-09T09:31:05Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T09:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98384"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01b245ba016d44861690594e10f67e026ce8552f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2534a5e5d360c2b10203cfa80f4ab9d021e48f2f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b4eb82475ae17d55974235c09e97044829426a8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91a482a81eabddebf5430cbbdf12027e1a91b767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9651704c6fd64590b5ad4fbe7c3768accf95993"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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