GHSA-RJ9G-HQC5-RQG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated()
nci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array ndev->targets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev->n_targets without first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling nci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS.
ndev->n_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC that repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters NCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an auto-activated target (RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF) drives n_targets past the limit. The append then writes a struct nfc_target past the end of the array (a slab out-of-bounds write), and nfc_targets_found() goes on to walk the array with the inflated count:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci] Write of size 2 at addr ffff0000c7299a18 by task kworker/u8:0/12 Workqueue: nfc0_nci_rx_wq nci_rx_work [nci] Call trace: nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci] nci_ntf_packet+0xddc/0x11a0 [nci] nci_rx_work+0x15c/0x1e0 [nci] process_one_work+0x2dc/0x500 worker_thread+0x240/0x460 kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1024 bytes to the right of allocated 1560-byte region [ffff0000c7299000, ffff0000c7299618)
Guard nci_target_auto_activated() with the same check used by nci_add_new_target().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80795"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated()\n\nnci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array\nndev-\u003etargets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev-\u003en_targets\nwithout first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling\nnci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals\nNCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS.\n\nndev-\u003en_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC\nthat repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters\nNCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an\nauto-activated target (RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF) drives n_targets past the\nlimit. The append then writes a struct nfc_target past the end of the\narray (a slab out-of-bounds write), and nfc_targets_found() goes on to\nwalk the array with the inflated count:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]\n Write of size 2 at addr ffff0000c7299a18 by task kworker/u8:0/12\n Workqueue: nfc0_nci_rx_wq nci_rx_work [nci]\n Call trace:\n nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]\n nci_ntf_packet+0xddc/0x11a0 [nci]\n nci_rx_work+0x15c/0x1e0 [nci]\n process_one_work+0x2dc/0x500\n worker_thread+0x240/0x460\n kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n\n The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048\n The buggy address is located 1024 bytes to the right of\n allocated 1560-byte region [ffff0000c7299000, ffff0000c7299618)\n\nGuard nci_target_auto_activated() with the same check used by\nnci_add_new_target().",
"id": "GHSA-rj9g-hqc5-rqg9",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0dc59de0075f88404a0f4a2b5233104ef459fbb2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/129032c0616d83a5e3e304f6ebf88f14ba01e5f7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24761d3a5f692df5f7d848caeabcb2afd10917aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f08dbce3b37624ec6b424d759336a99586170ec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50e87e1c0e18d791dcd7dccf30f9a2f3e2cf3951"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94530ffabfca57e9bff1d207106010014cc84032"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac200079db50af81e6b04d058b33ec92901d8edd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afd8605fb43becb892311102844955c3b127fc7e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7083f41c21b30582e91b2e6de4d54dce74f6f9c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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