GHSA-RJ5F-9XF7-69H7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl
While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent schedule_timeout: wrong
timeout value warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller
state machine corruption.
The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().
A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes
the arg > INT_MAX check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This
results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the
internal (int)m < 0 check in msecs_to_jiffies().
The truncated value is then assigned to client->adapter->timeout
(a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number.
When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value
undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned long, triggering the
schedule_timeout warning and causing premature returns. This leaves
the SMBus state machine in an unrecoverable state, constituting a
local Denial of Service (DoS).
Fix this by bounding the user argument to INT_MAX / 10.
[wsa: move the comment as well]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:04Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl\n\nWhile fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent `schedule_timeout: wrong\ntimeout value` warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller\nstate machine corruption.\n\nThe I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of\n10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is\nsubsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().\n\nA malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes\nthe `arg \u003e INT_MAX` check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This\nresults in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the\ninternal `(int)m \u003c 0` check in `msecs_to_jiffies()`.\n\nThe truncated value is then assigned to `client-\u003eadapter-\u003etimeout`\n(a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number.\nWhen passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value\nundergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned long, triggering the\n`schedule_timeout` warning and causing premature returns. This leaves\nthe SMBus state machine in an unrecoverable state, constituting a\nlocal Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nFix this by bounding the user argument to `INT_MAX / 10`.\n\n[wsa: move the comment as well]",
"id": "GHSA-rj5f-9xf7-69h7",
"modified": "2026-06-24T18:32:41Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b88ecfbc9dc33b4db8836c37b50cf174e6c0691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4576621dc6577f21a032acfd16c3ad61907a5ea7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/617eb7c0961a8dfcfc811844a6396e406b2923ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/943e318eedbeaeea08ece3f5dd44c982f4ed2ef5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa6ef734016912653a909477fb30aeb66c98b3a2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9ffd5f5050fbb199d270a85614cd27ebed6fbac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff02add34ffd03449b8115904ebe2ec4fed022d4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffbcf31f032eb454ebfd29309f51366fe57f4ac4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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