GHSA-RHPM-RXF4-Q3HF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-27 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit race".
damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they race with kdamond terminations. Fix those.
This patch (of 2);
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call() requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel, the request memory would be leaked.
The issue is found by sashiko [1].
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46025"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T14:17:21Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race\n\nPatch series \"mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit\nrace\".\n\ndamon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they\nrace with kdamond terminations. Fix those.\n\n\nThis patch (of 2);\n\nWhen kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all\nremaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx-\u003ekdamond so that\nAPI callers and API functions themselves can know the context is\nterminated. damon_call() adds the caller\u0027s request to the queue first. \nAfter that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running\n(damon_ctx-\u003ekdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call()\nstarts waiting for the kdamond\u0027s handling of the newly added request.\n\nThe damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx-\u003ekdamond unset are\nprotected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race\nwith damon_ctx-\u003ekdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.\n\nFor example, let\u0027s suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call()\nrequests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the\ncontext. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still\nrunning, because damon_ctx-\u003ekdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the\ndamon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. \nHowever, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never\nhandles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads\ninfinitely waits.\n\nFix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely\ncall_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the\ndamon_ctx-\u003ecall_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests\nregistration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting\ndamon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining\ndamon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field\nunder the lock and avoids adding a new request.\n\nAfter this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or\ncancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context\ntermination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.\n\nNote that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for\nrepeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting\nfor the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the\nkdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel,\nthe request memory would be leaked.\n\nThe issue is found by sashiko [1].",
"id": "GHSA-rhpm-rxf4-q3hf",
"modified": "2026-05-27T15:33:21Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T15:33:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2691332ad88b57179c38653e2cd613d5820a52cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55da81663b9642dd046b26dd6f1baddbcf337c1e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6a053a6f4b5048746c49432a5cc5b79fe4695fe"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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