Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "motioneye"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.44.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-732"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T17:11:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye\n\n## Summary\n\nmotionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` with `644` permissions (`-rw-r--r--`), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- motionEye \u003c= 0.43.1b4\n- Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies `0600` mode to `motion.conf` and `camera-*.conf` files)\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)\n\nWhen motionEye writes its configuration, the file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` is created with `644` permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the `@admin_password` field:\n\n```\n# @admin_username admin\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\nAny local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:\n\n```bash\n$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\nAdditionally, per-camera configuration files (`camera-*.conf`) are also created with the same `644` permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:\n\n- **Offline password cracking:** The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext admin password\n- **Authentication bypass:** When combined with the signature authentication weakness (see GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), the hash can be used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests\n- **Full system compromise:** When further chained with CVE-2025-60787 (OS command injection), a local unprivileged user can escalate to the Motion daemon user (often root)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin\u0027s password:\n\n```bash\n# Verify the file permissions\n$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n\n# Read the hash as an unprivileged user\n$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n\n# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)\n$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c \"import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b\u0027testpassword123\u0027).hexdigest())\"\nc18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\n### Verified Output\n\nThe following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official `motioneye_init` method, admin password set to `testpassword123`):\n\n```\n$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n\n$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password\n# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n\n$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c \"import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b\u0027testpassword123\u0027).hexdigest())\"\nc18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n```\n\nThe hash extracted by the unprivileged `testuser` matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\nThis vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.\n\n### Method 1: Manual Installation\n\n1. Install motionEye on a Linux system:\n   ```bash\n   sudo pip install motioneye\n   mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye\n   cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf\n   sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf\n   ```\n\n2. Set an admin password via the web UI at `http://localhost:8765`\n\n3. Verify the config file is world-readable:\n   ```bash\n   ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   ```\n\n4. As an unprivileged user, read the hash:\n   ```bash\n   sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n   ```\n\n### Method 2: Official `motioneye_init` Installation\n\n1. Install motionEye using the official init script:\n   ```bash\n   sudo pip install motioneye\n   sudo motioneye_init\n   ```\n\n2. The `motioneye_init` script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at `http://localhost:8765`\n\n3. Verify the config file is still world-readable:\n   ```bash\n   ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   ```\n\n   Note that while the ownership changes to `motion:motion` (instead of `root:root` in the manual method), the permissions remain `644`, meaning any local user can still read the file.\n\n4. Confirm as an unprivileged user:\n   ```bash\n   sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf\n   # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37\n   ```\n\nBoth installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.\n\n## Related Vulnerabilities\n\n- **GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3:** Password hash accepted as API signing key (CWE-836), which allows the hash exposed by this vulnerability to be used for forging authenticated admin API requests\n- **CVE-2025-60787:** OS command injection via `image_file_name`, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to root\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n1. **Fix file permissions:** Create `motion.conf` and `camera-*.conf` with `600` permissions (`-rw-------`), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-03-11:** Vulnerability discovered during security research\n- **2026-03-11:** Vendor notified via GitHub Security Advisory\n- **2026-03-12:** Vendor acknowledged, confirmed fix in motionEye 0.44.0b1",
  "id": "GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T17:11:37Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T17:11:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "motionEye\u0027s World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash"
}