GHSA-RG84-FRXC-RFCX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ptrace: Keep 'orig_x0' in-sync with x0 on syscall entry
Commit e057b9477232 ("arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates") attempted to resolve a long-standing issue with syscall entry tracing, where a tracer is able to manipulate the first syscall argument without being subjected to seccomp or audit checking.
Unfortunately, that fix was incomplete [1], as it failed to update 'orig_x0' between a tracer updating x0 during a seccomp ptrace exit (SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) and the seccomp filter being re-evaluated.
Rather than add hooks to the core seccomp code, instead move the synchronisation code into the ptrace GPR and syscall setting code so that 'orig_x0' is kept up to date with x0 whenever we're stopped on the syscall entry path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: ptrace: Keep \u0027orig_x0\u0027 in-sync with x0 on syscall entry\n\nCommit e057b9477232 (\"arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync\nwith tracer updates\") attempted to resolve a long-standing issue with\nsyscall entry tracing, where a tracer is able to manipulate the first\nsyscall argument without being subjected to seccomp or audit checking.\n\nUnfortunately, that fix was incomplete [1], as it failed to update\n\u0027orig_x0\u0027 between a tracer updating x0 during a seccomp ptrace exit\n(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) and the seccomp filter being re-evaluated.\n\nRather than add hooks to the core seccomp code, instead move the\nsynchronisation code into the ptrace GPR and syscall setting code so\nthat \u0027orig_x0\u0027 is kept up to date with x0 whenever we\u0027re stopped on the\nsyscall entry path.",
"id": "GHSA-rg84-frxc-rfcx",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/332c9c1a148d0425326989c1187face8f6b2a60c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b839ce497ccb1ff92f7ae742c78dd2937ba572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9e7743b1067ea38c4ad2665d40c3c4a920ad9a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce17c651a90e242ad48df0df89b1e4cebcda5e14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e2854fcff5733ffc607e8ecc87e0e591ab41fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f433869f23841a50455c4087d85540d5b4d37cde"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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