GHSA-RFJF-R326-RPVJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-21 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: free learned nodes on device setup failure
hsr_dev_finalize() can fail after a lower-device RX handler has already been registered (slave A is added before the failable slave B and interlink adds). RX handlers run in softirq regardless of the master's state, so frames received in that window can learn dynamic nodes into node_db, and the error unwind never releases them.
Free both owned dynamic databases in the unwind, mirroring hsr_dellink(). proxy_node_db is provably empty on every current error exit (only interlink RX feeds it, and the interlink add is the last failable step) and is freed for symmetry. The order is safe: hsr_del_port() unregisters each RX handler with synchronize_net() before hsr_del_nodes() runs, which removes remaining entries with list_del_rcu() and defers their release with call_rcu() for readers already under RCU.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-100071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T14:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: hsr: free learned nodes on device setup failure\n\nhsr_dev_finalize() can fail after a lower-device RX handler has\nalready been registered (slave A is added before the failable slave B\nand interlink adds). RX handlers run in softirq regardless of the\nmaster\u0027s state, so frames received in that window can learn dynamic\nnodes into node_db, and the error unwind never releases them.\n\nFree both owned dynamic databases in the unwind, mirroring\nhsr_dellink(). proxy_node_db is provably empty on every current error\nexit (only interlink RX feeds it, and the interlink add is the last\nfailable step) and is freed for symmetry. The order is safe:\nhsr_del_port() unregisters each RX handler with synchronize_net()\nbefore hsr_del_nodes() runs, which removes remaining entries with\nlist_del_rcu() and defers their release with call_rcu() for readers\nalready under RCU.",
"id": "GHSA-rfjf-r326-rpvj",
"modified": "2026-10-21T21:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a340ffd96943a49a78e367efac9517ca767d99b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49b01f2939abc676a6f9a118f07a10110ee5f683"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65702339b3e9fd792f65d4b740928798194d86ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f16289b91eb316f170a6bd22d32e6c632f6a5b6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e691eee886871b933d772ffc76d66c80b4c0a25e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7289e3492f2694dccd3d79287e0e31879b58650"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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