GHSA-RCVJ-J33H-JP62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: fix list corruption when deferred_split_scan() races with deferred_split_folio()
Since the deferred split queue became a list_lru, the isolate callback moves the folios it took a reference on to an on-stack list, linked through folio->_deferred_list, and deferred_split_scan() takes them off that list with list_del_init() without holding the list_lru lock.
deferred_split_folio() does not know about the on-stack list. It only holds the list_lru lock when it looks at the same list_head, and it can run for such a folio: a THP is queued when it is mapped, as a candidate for the underused check, and is queued "again" when a part of it gets unmapped:
CPU0 deferred_split_scan() CPU1 deferred_split_folio() list_del_init(&folio->_deferred_list) next->prev = prev prev->next = next entry->next = entry list_lru_lock_irqsave() folio_set_partially_mapped() __list_lru_add() list_empty(item) -> true list_add_tail(item, &l->list) item->next = &l->list item->prev = tail entry->prev = entry
The folio now sits on the list_lru with ->prev pointing to itself. The next removal leaves the neighbours pointing to it, and they still do so after the folio has been freed. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffd4000000270090, but was ffd4000000278090. (prev=ffd4000000270090)
Fix it by grabbing the lock around list_del_init() so deferred_split_folio() cannot race with it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99728"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:09Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/huge_memory: fix list corruption when deferred_split_scan() races with deferred_split_folio()\n\nSince the deferred split queue became a list_lru, the isolate callback\nmoves the folios it took a reference on to an on-stack list, linked\nthrough folio-\u003e_deferred_list, and deferred_split_scan() takes them off\nthat list with list_del_init() without holding the list_lru lock.\n\ndeferred_split_folio() does not know about the on-stack list. It only\nholds the list_lru lock when it looks at the same list_head, and it can\nrun for such a folio: a THP is queued when it is mapped, as a candidate\nfor the underused check, and is queued \"again\" when a part of it gets\nunmapped:\n\n CPU0 deferred_split_scan() CPU1 deferred_split_folio()\n list_del_init(\u0026folio-\u003e_deferred_list)\n next-\u003eprev = prev\n prev-\u003enext = next\n entry-\u003enext = entry\n list_lru_lock_irqsave()\n folio_set_partially_mapped()\n __list_lru_add()\n list_empty(item) -\u003e true\n list_add_tail(item, \u0026l-\u003elist)\n item-\u003enext = \u0026l-\u003elist\n item-\u003eprev = tail\n entry-\u003eprev = entry\n\nThe folio now sits on the list_lru with -\u003eprev pointing to itself. The\nnext removal leaves the neighbours pointing to it, and they still do so\nafter the folio has been freed. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST:\n\n list_del corruption. prev-\u003enext should be ffd4000000270090, but was\n ffd4000000278090. (prev=ffd4000000270090)\n\nFix it by grabbing the lock around list_del_init() so\ndeferred_split_folio() cannot race with it.",
"id": "GHSA-rcvj-j33h-jp62",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99728"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/877a9fbabf760714f510f36b310a986c4be2c2d8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f09171b67ea06a7fe425db33e8b74a92de1426b9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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