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GHSA-R9WM-P769-97J8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow

iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes changed ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data within EOF. This trims io_size when a writeback range extends past end_pos:

ioend->io_size += map_len;
if (ioend->io_offset + ioend->io_size > end_pos)
    ioend->io_size = end_pos - ioend->io_offset;

However, if end_pos ends up below ioend->io_offset, the subtraction becomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned wrap to a huge value. This can happen when writeback continues past byte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent truncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in iomap_writeback_handle_eof().

A wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt completion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume io_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW completion ranges.

Fix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before the ioend start offset. This preserves the original intent of trimming io_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72367"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow\n\niomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes\nchanged ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data\nwithin EOF.  This trims io_size when a writeback range extends\npast end_pos:\n\n    ioend-\u003eio_size += map_len;\n    if (ioend-\u003eio_offset + ioend-\u003eio_size \u003e end_pos)\n        ioend-\u003eio_size = end_pos - ioend-\u003eio_offset;\n\nHowever, if end_pos ends up below ioend-\u003eio_offset, the subtraction\nbecomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned\nwrap to a huge value.  This can happen when writeback continues past\nbyte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent\ntruncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in\niomap_writeback_handle_eof().\n\nA wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt\ncompletion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume\nio_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW\ncompletion ranges.\n\nFix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before\nthe ioend start offset.  This preserves the original intent of trimming\nio_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow.",
  "id": "GHSA-r9wm-p769-97j8",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:25Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f38f65bf965fce9aa159d45c5347538f56c5973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55ec50d046c03b3724741957f7b007856e36dbe7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f7780abb4c0fdc9a2603aea8e985ff14ee900e0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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