GHSA-R9FC-FX9C-46M4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 12:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 12:32Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Core component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
The saga processor consulted a header named Long-Running-Action to decide which saga an exchange belonged to. The name carries no Camel prefix, so it sits outside the namespace that consumer header filters block, and an external sender could supply it on an inbound message. That let the sender name the saga the exchange joined, attaching their request to a long-running action started by someone else, or causing compensation to be associated with an action they did not initiate. The header is only consulted by a saga service that uses it, which bounds the exposure to deployments running sagas over an LRA coordinator.
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. The header is now consulted only for a saga service that actually uses it, rather than on every exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the header at the trust boundary with removeHeaders("Long-Running-Action") on every consumer that accepts messages from an untrusted sender.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85312"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T11:17:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Core component.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\nThe saga processor consulted a header named Long-Running-Action to decide which saga an exchange belonged to. The name carries no Camel prefix, so it sits outside the namespace that consumer header filters block, and an external sender could supply it on an inbound message. That let the sender name the saga the exchange joined, attaching their request to a long-running action started by someone else, or causing compensation to be associated with an action they did not initiate. The header is only consulted by a saga service that uses it, which bounds the exposure to deployments running sagas over an LRA coordinator.\n\nUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. The header is now consulted only for a saga service that actually uses it, rather than on every exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the header at the trust boundary with removeHeaders(\"Long-Running-Action\") on every consumer that accepts messages from an untrusted sender.",
"id": "GHSA-r9fc-fx9c-46m4",
"modified": "2026-10-19T12:32:52Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T12:32:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85312"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-85312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24449"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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