GHSA-R99W-JH2X-3MG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 19:32 – Updated: 2026-11-13 19:32Summary
Since 4.6.0, Nuxt parses a request path that starts with // as a URL with a host before rendering a page, so //x/admin renders the page at /admin. Nitro's routing, Nitro's route rules and server/middleware see the path as //x/admin, so server-side checks keyed on /admin do not apply. The fix for GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33 in 4.6.3 covered dot segments but not this form.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can bypass server-side controls that match on the request path of a page route.
A route-scoped server handler is skipped:
// nuxt.config.ts
export default defineNuxtConfig({
serverHandlers: [{ route: '/admin', middleware: true, handler: '~~/server/admin-guard.ts' }],
})
// server/admin-guard.ts
export default defineEventHandler((event) => {
if (!isAuthenticated(event)) {
throw createError({ statusCode: 401 })
}
})
With this handler, /admin returns 401, but //x/admin and ///x/admin render app/pages/admin.vue along with the data it fetches during server rendering. server/middleware that checks event.path.startsWith('/admin') is skipped in the same way.
Server-side redirect and headers route rules are also skipped, so '/admin/**': { redirect: '/login' } does not redirect //x/admin/secret, and per-route security headers such as Content-Security-Policy are not sent.
Browsers send a path such as //x/admin as written, so a plain link is enough to reach the page.
Not affected:
- API handlers in
server/apiandserver/routes, which Nitro does not match for these paths. appMiddlewareroute rules and middleware declared withdefinePageMeta, which are matched against the resolved route.- Nuxt
3.xand4.0.0to4.5.x, which pass the path to the page router unchanged, so these requests 404.
Patches
Fixed in @nuxt/nitro-server@4.6.4, which nuxt@4.6.4 depends on. The renderer now uses the request path exactly as Nitro matched it, so a path starting with // no longer resolves to a different page.
Workarounds
Reject request paths that start with // in a server middleware:
// server/middleware/double-slash.ts
export default defineEventHandler((event) => {
if (event.path.startsWith('//')) {
throw createError({ statusCode: 404 })
}
})
A reverse proxy or CDN that merges repeated slashes before forwarding the request also removes the mismatch.
Credits
Nuxt thanks @kq5y for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/nitro-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-128077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T19:32:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-13T18:17:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSince `4.6.0`, Nuxt parses a request path that starts with `//` as a URL with a host before rendering a page, so `//x/admin` renders the page at `/admin`. Nitro\u0027s routing, Nitro\u0027s route rules and `server/middleware` see the path as `//x/admin`, so server-side checks keyed on `/admin` do not apply. The fix for [GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33) in `4.6.3` covered dot segments but not this form.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can bypass server-side controls that match on the request path of a page route.\n\nA route-scoped server handler is skipped:\n\n```ts\n// nuxt.config.ts\nexport default defineNuxtConfig({\n serverHandlers: [{ route: \u0027/admin\u0027, middleware: true, handler: \u0027~~/server/admin-guard.ts\u0027 }],\n})\n```\n\n```ts\n// server/admin-guard.ts\nexport default defineEventHandler((event) =\u003e {\n if (!isAuthenticated(event)) {\n throw createError({ statusCode: 401 })\n }\n})\n```\n\nWith this handler, `/admin` returns 401, but `//x/admin` and `///x/admin` render `app/pages/admin.vue` along with the data it fetches during server rendering. `server/middleware` that checks `event.path.startsWith(\u0027/admin\u0027)` is skipped in the same way.\n\nServer-side `redirect` and `headers` route rules are also skipped, so `\u0027/admin/**\u0027: { redirect: \u0027/login\u0027 }` does not redirect `//x/admin/secret`, and per-route security headers such as `Content-Security-Policy` are not sent.\n\nBrowsers send a path such as `//x/admin` as written, so a plain link is enough to reach the page.\n\nNot affected:\n\n- API handlers in `server/api` and `server/routes`, which Nitro does not match for these paths.\n- `appMiddleware` route rules and middleware declared with `definePageMeta`, which are matched against the resolved route.\n- Nuxt `3.x` and `4.0.0` to `4.5.x`, which pass the path to the page router unchanged, so these requests 404.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@nuxt/nitro-server@4.6.4`, which `nuxt@4.6.4` depends on. The renderer now uses the request path exactly as Nitro matched it, so a path starting with `//` no longer resolves to a different page.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nReject request paths that start with `//` in a server middleware:\n\n```ts\n// server/middleware/double-slash.ts\nexport default defineEventHandler((event) =\u003e {\n if (event.path.startsWith(\u0027//\u0027)) {\n throw createError({ statusCode: 404 })\n }\n})\n```\n\nA reverse proxy or CDN that merges repeated slashes before forwarding the request also removes the mismatch.\n\n### Credits\n\nNuxt thanks @kq5y for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-r99w-jh2x-3mg9",
"modified": "2026-11-13T19:32:21Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T19:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-r99w-jh2x-3mg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/75c12c6fb4c22ec2cbde0051da24776d2dffa868"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/releases/tag/v4.6.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nuxt: Incomplete fix for GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33: a leading `//` in the request path bypasses `server/middleware` path checks and server route rules on page routes"
}
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