GHSA-R98F-GFC3-J3GF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ovl: fail the mount if the casefold flag has changed

An unprivileged user in a user namespace can repeatedly trigger a kernel warning with their own overlay mounts. They do so by changing the casefold flag of the topmost layer's empty root, the top directory of that layer, after the layers are set and before the mount is created.

The casefold flag of a directory makes name lookups in that directory case-insensitive. All layers of an overlay must agree on casefolding.

ovl_mount_dir_check() reads the casefold flag of a layer root when fsconfig() sets that layer, and saves the result in ofs->casefold. The mount is created later, by another fsconfig() call with FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE.

The casefold flag of an empty directory can be changed.

The casefold flag of the overlay root must match ofs->casefold. ovl_get_root() copies the flag from the topmost layer root, as it is when the mount is created. On a mismatch, ovl_get_root() only does a WARN_ON(), and the mount continues. The check is not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so each such mount warns again.

An unprivileged user needs CONFIG_UNICODE, and a tmpfs mounted with the casefold option in their namespace.

Reproduced by changing the casefold flag of the empty upper directory after the layers were set and before FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, with tmpfs and ext4 layers, and as uid 1000 in a user namespace.

Fix this by replacing the WARN_ON() with a check that fails the mount with -EINVAL.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99641"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:17:57Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: fail the mount if the casefold flag has changed\n\nAn unprivileged user in a user namespace can repeatedly trigger a kernel\nwarning with their own overlay mounts. They do so by changing the\ncasefold flag of the topmost layer\u0027s empty root, the top directory of\nthat layer, after the layers are set and before the mount is created.\n\nThe casefold flag of a directory makes name lookups in that directory\ncase-insensitive. All layers of an overlay must agree on casefolding.\n\novl_mount_dir_check() reads the casefold flag of a layer root when\nfsconfig() sets that layer, and saves the result in ofs-\u003ecasefold. The\nmount is created later, by another fsconfig() call with\nFSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE.\n\nThe casefold flag of an empty directory can be changed.\n\nThe casefold flag of the overlay root must match ofs-\u003ecasefold.\novl_get_root() copies the flag from the topmost layer root, as it is\nwhen the mount is created. On a mismatch, ovl_get_root() only does a\nWARN_ON(), and the mount continues. The check is not a WARN_ON_ONCE(),\nso each such mount warns again.\n\nAn unprivileged user needs CONFIG_UNICODE, and a tmpfs mounted with the\ncasefold option in their namespace.\n\nReproduced by changing the casefold flag of the empty upper directory\nafter the layers were set and before FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, with tmpfs and\next4 layers, and as uid 1000 in a user namespace.\n\nFix this by replacing the WARN_ON() with a check that fails the mount\nwith -EINVAL.",
  "id": "GHSA-r98f-gfc3-j3gf",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:05Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99641"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/549fb7c77951ad9ddfed05ce1776f497538ad13e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c782fc8ada811569811c0fdea5c3412511be95d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f182e7bc11c401d09f890ee1a3ec359670e1e308"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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