GHSA-R8CR-4F9W-7R75

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 19:48 – Updated: 2026-09-15 19:48
VLAI
Summary
Netmaker has a boolean‑based SQL Injection
Details

SQL Injection in Netmaker SQLite Database Backend

Summary

The sqliteDeleteRecord function in Netmaker's database layer constructs SQL DELETE statements using direct string concatenation of user-supplied input. This allows an authenticated attacker to perform boolean-based SQL injection.


Details

The endpoint:

DELETE /api/dns/{network}/{domain}

passes user-controlled path parameters through the following flow:

logic.DeleteDNS → database.DeleteRecord → sqliteDeleteRecord

Depending on the configured database backend, the request eventually reaches the SQLite database implementation.

Vulnerable Code

The SQL query is constructed using direct string concatenation without parameterization.

```go // database/sqlite.go deleteSQL := "DELETE FROM " + tableName + " WHERE key = \"" + key + "\""

The key value originates from user input ({domain} path parameter) and is embedded directly into the SQL query.

Exploitation

An authenticated attacker can inject SQL operators into the {domain} path parameter to manipulate the query logic.

Because this injection is boolean-based, attackers extract data indirectly by observing the outcome of the operation:

If the injected condition evaluates true, the DNS record is deleted.

If the condition evaluates false, the DNS record remains.

By repeating this process, an attacker can infer information such as:

Database table names

Column names

Column values

Value lengths

Impact

An authenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to extract data from arbitrary database tables when using the SQLite backend.

Unaffected backend:

PostgreSQL (uses parameterised queries with $1, $2 placeholders)

Patches

This vulnerability is fixed in version (fill in).

The patch replaces string concatenation with parameterised SQL queries for all user-supplied values in database operations.


Credit

Artem Danilov (Positive Technologies)

Daniil Satyaev (Independent)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gravitl/netmaker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32599"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-15T19:48:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# SQL Injection in Netmaker SQLite Database Backend\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `sqliteDeleteRecord` function in Netmaker\u0027s database layer constructs SQL `DELETE` statements using direct string concatenation of user-supplied input. This allows an authenticated attacker to perform **boolean-based SQL injection**.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nThe endpoint:\n\n\nDELETE /api/dns/{network}/{domain}\n\n\npasses user-controlled path parameters through the following flow:\n\n\nlogic.DeleteDNS \u2192 database.DeleteRecord \u2192 sqliteDeleteRecord\n\n\nDepending on the configured database backend, the request eventually reaches the SQLite database implementation.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\nThe SQL query is constructed using direct string concatenation without parameterization.\n\n```go\n// database/sqlite.go\ndeleteSQL := \"DELETE FROM \" + tableName + \" WHERE key = \\\"\" + key + \"\\\"\"\n\nThe key value originates from user input ({domain} path parameter) and is embedded directly into the SQL query.\n\nExploitation\n\nAn authenticated attacker can inject SQL operators into the {domain} path parameter to manipulate the query logic.\n\nBecause this injection is boolean-based, attackers extract data indirectly by observing the outcome of the operation:\n\nIf the injected condition evaluates true, the DNS record is deleted.\n\nIf the condition evaluates false, the DNS record remains.\n\nBy repeating this process, an attacker can infer information such as:\n\nDatabase table names\n\nColumn names\n\nColumn values\n\nValue lengths\n\nImpact\n\nAn authenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to extract data from arbitrary database tables when using the SQLite backend.\n\nUnaffected backend:\n\nPostgreSQL (uses parameterised queries with $1, $2 placeholders)\n\nPatches\n\nThis vulnerability is fixed in version (fill in).\n\nThe patch replaces string concatenation with parameterised SQL queries for all user-supplied values in database operations.\n\n\n---\nCredit\n\nArtem Danilov\n(Positive Technologies)\n\nDaniil Satyaev (Independent)",
  "id": "GHSA-r8cr-4f9w-7r75",
  "modified": "2026-09-15T19:48:49Z",
  "published": "2026-09-15T19:48:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/security/advisories/GHSA-r8cr-4f9w-7r75"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/releases/tag/v1.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netmaker has a boolean\u2011based SQL Injection"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.