GHSA-R5WM-5XW8-PRJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: force complete the KIQ ring fences on reset
Like the MES scheduler ring, the KIQ ring sets no_scheduler = true and uses a polling fence, so it is skipped by the force-completion loop in amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset(). Its hw fence value lives in wb (GTT) memory and survives a MODE1 reset while fence_drv.sync_seq keeps advancing, so after a reset the first KIQ submission can poll forever on a seq that is never written back.
Force complete the KIQ ring fences too so their hw fence is realigned to sync_seq.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89813"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:46Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: force complete the KIQ ring fences on reset\n\nLike the MES scheduler ring, the KIQ ring sets no_scheduler = true and uses a\npolling fence, so it is skipped by the force-completion loop in\namdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset(). Its hw fence value lives in wb (GTT) memory and\nsurvives a MODE1 reset while fence_drv.sync_seq keeps advancing, so after a\nreset the first KIQ submission can poll forever on a seq that is never written\nback.\n\nForce complete the KIQ ring fences too so their hw fence is realigned to\nsync_seq.",
"id": "GHSA-r5wm-5xw8-prj5",
"modified": "2026-09-16T12:30:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdd6a58743e00ebc6d52b9cdf9aafb4e535e0b71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd65d1742992361fc2201ecb4e43411e6e417fcb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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