GHSA-R56G-VPX5-3639

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-28 09:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: timer: Forcibly close timer instances at closing

When snd_timer object is freed via snd_timer_free() and still pending snd_timer_instance objects are assigned to the timer object, it tries to unlink all instances and just set NULL to each ti->timer, then releases the resources immediately. The problem is, however, when there are slave timer instances that are associated with a master instance linked to this timer: namely, those slave instances still point to the freed timer object although the master instance is unlinked, which may lead to user-after-free. The bug can be easily triggered particularly when a new userspace-driven timers (CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) is involved, since it can create and delete the timer object via a simple file open/close, while the other applications may keep accessing to that timer.

This patch is an attempt to paper over the problem above: now instead of just unlinking, call snd_timer_close_locked forcibly for each pending timer instance, so that all assigned slave timer instances are properly detached, too. Since snd_timer_close() might be called later by the driver that created that instance, the check of SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD is added at the beginning, too.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53193"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: timer: Forcibly close timer instances at closing\n\nWhen snd_timer object is freed via snd_timer_free() and still pending\nsnd_timer_instance objects are assigned to the timer object, it tries\nto unlink all instances and just set NULL to each ti-\u003etimer, then\nreleases the resources immediately.  The problem is, however, when\nthere are slave timer instances that are associated with a master\ninstance linked to this timer: namely, those slave instances still\npoint to the freed timer object although the master instance is\nunlinked, which may lead to user-after-free.  The bug can be easily\ntriggered particularly when a new userspace-driven timers\n(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) is involved, since it can create and delete the\ntimer object via a simple file open/close, while the other\napplications may keep accessing to that timer.\n\nThis patch is an attempt to paper over the problem above: now instead\nof just unlinking, call snd_timer_close[_locked]() forcibly for each\npending timer instance, so that all assigned slave timer instances are\nproperly detached, too.  Since snd_timer_close() might be called later\nby the driver that created that instance, the check of\nSNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD is added at the beginning, too.",
  "id": "GHSA-r56g-vpx5-3639",
  "modified": "2026-06-28T09:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53193"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/586b219a22b1032b28b8bd356b963276c5e5bf53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60e73ab87b84bbd6bd7ddd1d16019a3a3705ab8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da3039e91d1f835874ed6e9a33ea19ee80c2cb92"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f46093dd22969037beb1fce2e043f3236be41c92"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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