GHSA-R4QC-2GCR-R82J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply

nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c ("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out: label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.

NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache() runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info. From a 6.12.91 production server:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004 CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd] RDX: 0000000000000000 Call Trace: nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd] nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd] svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc] svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc] svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc] nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the replay still holds in cstate->slot.

Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound response before each request, so the flag starts clear.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:48Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: don\u0027t modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply\n\nnfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE\nunder nn-\u003eclient_lock. A reply served from the slot\u0027s reply cache does\nnot claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate-\u003estatus, which\nnfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c\n(\"NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions\") moved\nnfsd4_proc_compound()\u0027s cstate-\u003estatus assignment below the out:\nlabel, and the replay path\u0027s goto out was the one path that relied on\nskipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer\nidentifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears\nNFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.\n\nNFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every\nsequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache()\nruns. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the\nsame slot at once. One can read slot-\u003esl_cred under nn-\u003eclient_lock\nwhile the other\u0027s completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR\nencoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each\nother and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves\ncr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every\nearlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info.\nFrom a 6.12.91 production server:\n\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004\n  CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd\n  RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd]\n  RDX: 0000000000000000\n  Call Trace:\n   nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd]\n   nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd]\n   nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd]\n   svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc]\n   svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc]\n   svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc]\n   nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd]\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nSince v6.14 a live session\u0027s slot table can shrink, and the unowned\nstore becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the\nshrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a\nreplay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the\nreplay still holds in cstate-\u003eslot.\n\nRecord the claim in cstate-\u003eslot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a\nrequest and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request\nthat claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears\nNFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound\nresponse before each request, so the flag starts clear.",
  "id": "GHSA-r4qc-2gcr-r82j",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99366"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/065764e256ebff20201dca5bc6ff075c6cb62e17"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b5149b7ad8ccd64c61e887e2cf1af068b6210c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2987838317501ff67b672ac2a441fe34b7729f3d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e3c12151f13c4e51eb381f9377835fb94b9f56a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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