GHSA-R48X-XHW6-JMG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
The verifier rejects variable offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF accesses, but it currently accepts a constant negative offset produced by pointer arithmetic.
Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers") moved constant pointer offsets from reg->off to reg->var_off. However, __check_buffer_access() continued to check only the instruction offset. An access with reg->var_off equal to -8 and an instruction offset of zero therefore passes verification.
For writable raw tracepoints, the access end is also calculated from the unsigned reg->var_off.value. An eight-byte access starting at -8 wraps the calculated end to zero, allowing the program to load and attach without increasing max_tp_access.
After ensuring that reg->var_off is constant, calculate the effective access start using signed arithmetic and reject it when it is negative. Use the validated start to calculate the access end for both PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68462"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:18:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers\n\nThe verifier rejects variable offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF\naccesses, but it currently accepts a constant negative offset produced by\npointer arithmetic.\n\nCommit 022ac0750883 (\"bpf: use reg-\u003evar_off instead of reg-\u003eoff for\npointers\") moved constant pointer offsets from reg-\u003eoff to reg-\u003evar_off.\nHowever, __check_buffer_access() continued to check only the instruction\noffset. An access with reg-\u003evar_off equal to -8 and an instruction offset\nof zero therefore passes verification.\n\nFor writable raw tracepoints, the access end is also calculated from the\nunsigned reg-\u003evar_off.value. An eight-byte access starting at -8 wraps\nthe calculated end to zero, allowing the program to load and attach\nwithout increasing max_tp_access.\n\nAfter ensuring that reg-\u003evar_off is constant, calculate the effective\naccess start using signed arithmetic and reject it when it is negative.\nUse the validated start to calculate the access end for both\nPTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF.",
"id": "GHSA-r48x-xhw6-jmg8",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:03Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68462"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/314bd592085c0720ef519f6edbc5f41440ff78d4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd4cfa8c8f9a17cdec0539334d28754bc1d8a5d9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.