GHSA-R3MW-X3XP-FJPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout
Currently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a condition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time and the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.
This happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in poll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 ("iopoll: Do not use timekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()") changed the behavior to no longer use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock time which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing out after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout takes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for loop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several minutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero value for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of starting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of unexpected hardware failures.
One-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7 minutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10 the measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly equivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.
Add a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93168"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout\n\nCurrently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a\ncondition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time\nand the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.\n\nThis happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in\npoll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 (\"iopoll: Do not use\ntimekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()\") changed the behavior to no\nlonger use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock\ntime which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing\nout after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout\ntakes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for\nloop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several\nminutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero\nvalue for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of\nstarting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of\nunexpected hardware failures.\n\nOne-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7\nminutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10\nthe measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly\nequivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in\nXILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.\n\nAdd a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value.",
"id": "GHSA-r3mw-x3xp-fjpr",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:41Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93168"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ba67aa183a3ce174d534425b67eda84f6e3c896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4237b5cc181a17f5a2a797655c1ce2c64e01c550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b5654d317277e6e505c23f8fa7e415237fefc7f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa99c4d1d63bbc26a5fc4c667d89b2595743c19d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c30a26d4987a01e619449bf170f584c007e07d75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f786e7b3adbf3bd14964a1cedf9d55b6ad91dcd7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.