GHSA-R39H-4C2P-3JXP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:43 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:56
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via attacker-controlled setup-api.js loaded from cwd during env-key resolution
Details

Summary

OpenClaw's bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to process.cwd() while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.

Impact

This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw on npm
  • Affected: versions before 2026.4.23
  • Fixed: 2026.4.23
  • Latest stable verified fixed: openclaw@2026.4.23, tag v2026.4.23

Fix

OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes process.cwd() as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js is not loaded through provider setup resolution.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707 (fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback)

Severity

Severity remains high because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user running OpenClaw. The CVSS vector is local/user-interaction scoped rather than network-only because the victim must run OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled directory.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45004"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:43:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw\u0027s bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to `process.cwd()` while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing `extensions/\u003cplugin\u003e/setup-api.js`, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected: versions before `2026.4.23`\n- Fixed: `2026.4.23`\n- Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes `process.cwd()` as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local `extensions/\u003cplugin\u003e/setup-api.js` is not loaded through provider setup resolution.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707` (`fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback`)\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity remains `high` because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user running OpenClaw. The CVSS vector is local/user-interaction scoped rather than network-only because the victim must run OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-r39h-4c2p-3jxp",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T15:56:39Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T18:43:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r39h-4c2p-3jxp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-code-execution-via-setup-api-js-in-current-working-directory"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via attacker-controlled setup-api.js loaded from cwd during env-key resolution"
}


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Nomenclature

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