GHSA-R39H-4C2P-3JXP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:43 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:56Summary
OpenClaw's bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to process.cwd() while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.
Impact
This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclawon npm - Affected: versions before
2026.4.23 - Fixed:
2026.4.23 - Latest stable verified fixed:
openclaw@2026.4.23, tagv2026.4.23
Fix
OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes process.cwd() as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js is not loaded through provider setup resolution.
Fix Commit(s)
993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707(fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback)
Severity
Severity remains high because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user running OpenClaw. The CVSS vector is local/user-interaction scoped rather than network-only because the victim must run OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45004"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:43:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw\u0027s bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to `process.cwd()` while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing `extensions/\u003cplugin\u003e/setup-api.js`, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected: versions before `2026.4.23`\n- Fixed: `2026.4.23`\n- Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes `process.cwd()` as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local `extensions/\u003cplugin\u003e/setup-api.js` is not loaded through provider setup resolution.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707` (`fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback`)\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity remains `high` because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user running OpenClaw. The CVSS vector is local/user-interaction scoped rather than network-only because the victim must run OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled directory.",
"id": "GHSA-r39h-4c2p-3jxp",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:56:39Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T18:43:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r39h-4c2p-3jxp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-code-execution-via-setup-api-js-in-current-working-directory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via attacker-controlled setup-api.js loaded from cwd during env-key resolution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.