GHSA-R344-XW3P-2FRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-19 16:08 – Updated: 2023-10-19 16:08
VLAI
Summary
Apollo Router vulnerable to Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
Details

Impact

The Apollo Router is a configurable, high-performance graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph that uses Apollo Federation. Affected versions are subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability which causes the Router to panic and terminate when a multi-part response is sent. When users send queries to the router that uses the @defer or Subscriptions, the Router will panic.

To be vulnerable, users of Router must have a coprocessor with coprocessor.supergraph.response configured in their router.yaml and also to support either @defer or Subscriptions.

Patches

Router version 1.33.0 has a fix for this vulnerability. https://github.com/apollographql/router/pull/4014 fixes the issue.

Workarounds

For affected versions, avoid using the coprocessor supergraph response:

# do not use this stage in your coprocessor configuration
coprocessor:
  supergraph:
    response:

Or you can disable defer and subscriptions support:

# disable defer and subscriptions:
supergraph:
  defer_support: false # enabled by default
subscription:
  enabled: false # disabled by default

and continue to use the coprocessor supergraph response.

References

https://github.com/apollographql/router/issues/4013

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "apollo-router"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.31.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-45812"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-703",
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-19T16:08:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-18T22:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe Apollo Router is a configurable, high-performance graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph that uses Apollo Federation. Affected versions are subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability which causes the Router to panic and terminate when a multi-part response is sent. When users send queries to the router that uses the `@defer` or Subscriptions, the Router will panic.\n \nTo be vulnerable, users of Router must have a coprocessor with `coprocessor.supergraph.response` configured in their `router.yaml` and also to support either `@defer` or Subscriptions.  \n\n### Patches\nRouter version 1.33.0 has a fix for this vulnerability. https://github.com/apollographql/router/pull/4014 fixes the issue.  \n\n### Workarounds\nFor affected versions, avoid using the coprocessor supergraph response:\n```yml\n# do not use this stage in your coprocessor configuration\ncoprocessor:\n  supergraph:\n    response:\n``` \n\nOr you can disable defer and subscriptions support:\n```yml\n# disable defer and subscriptions:\nsupergraph:\n  defer_support: false # enabled by default\nsubscription:\n  enabled: false # disabled by default\n```\nand continue to use the coprocessor supergraph response.\n### References\nhttps://github.com/apollographql/router/issues/4013\n",
  "id": "GHSA-r344-xw3p-2frj",
  "modified": "2023-10-19T16:08:10Z",
  "published": "2023-10-19T16:08:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/security/advisories/GHSA-r344-xw3p-2frj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/issues/4013"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/pull/4014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/commit/b917b8c117b46a2d508428c0856f4927dfcfc341"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apollo Router vulnerable to Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions"
}



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