GHSA-R233-7M73-5H45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-25 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:40In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Don't store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile attaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to reference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead, store netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing mlx5_adev aux device structure.
This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due to change profile failure.
$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads. dmesg: workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12 workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10 R10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0 R13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400 FS: 00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130 device_del+0x160/0x3d0 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22996"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-25T15:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Don\u0027t store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv\n\nmlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile\nattaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to\nreference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead,\nstore netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing\nmlx5_adev aux device structure.\n\nThis fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due\nto change profile failure.\n\n$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev\nError: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.\ndmesg:\nworkqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq \"mlx5e\": -EINTR\nmlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12\nmlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12\nworkqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq \"mlx5e\": -EINTR\nmlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12\nmlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12\n\n$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==\u003e oops\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\nPGD 0 P4D 0\nOops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\nCPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10\nR10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0\nR13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400\nFS: 00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200\n bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130\n device_del+0x160/0x3d0\n ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90\n mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0\n mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70\n mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220\n devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260\n devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140",
"id": "GHSA-r233-7m73-5h45",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:40:15Z",
"published": "2026-01-25T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/123eda2e5b1638e298e3a66bb1e64a8da92de5e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b3b902320214835013ce625053b0743a71c804c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3d4f87d41f5140f1cf5c02fce5cdad2637f6244"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcb2ad755a16cb0ecd2dc98234d71a6e216ae7fe"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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