GHSA-QXJR-36PM-Q2Q2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-12 15:31 – Updated: 2025-02-14 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"
The current directory offset allocator (based on mtree_alloc_cyclic) stores the next offset value to return in octx->next_offset. This mechanism typically returns values that increase monotonically over time. Eventually, though, the newly allocated offset value wraps back to a low number (say, 2) which is smaller than other already- allocated offset values.
Yu Kuai yukuai3@huawei.com reports that, after commit 64a7ce76fb90 ("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"), if a directory's offset allocator wraps, existing entries are no longer visible via readdir/getdents because offset_readdir() stops listing entries once an entry's offset is larger than octx->next_offset. These entries vanish persistently -- they can be looked up, but will never again appear in readdir(3) output.
The reason for this is that the commit treats directory offsets as monotonically increasing integer values rather than opaque cookies, and introduces this comparison:
if (dentry2offset(dentry) >= last_index) {
On 64-bit platforms, the directory offset value upper bound is 2^63 - 1. Directory offsets will monotonically increase for millions of years without wrapping.
On 32-bit platforms, however, LONG_MAX is 2^31 - 1. The allocator can wrap after only a few weeks (at worst).
Revert commit 64a7ce76fb90 ("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir") to prepare for a fix that can work properly on 32-bit systems and might apply to recent LTS kernels where shmem employs the simple_offset mechanism.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-12T14:15:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRevert \"libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir\"\n\nThe current directory offset allocator (based on mtree_alloc_cyclic)\nstores the next offset value to return in octx-\u003enext_offset. This\nmechanism typically returns values that increase monotonically over\ntime. Eventually, though, the newly allocated offset value wraps\nback to a low number (say, 2) which is smaller than other already-\nallocated offset values.\n\nYu Kuai \u003cyukuai3@huawei.com\u003e reports that, after commit 64a7ce76fb90\n(\"libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir\"), if a\ndirectory\u0027s offset allocator wraps, existing entries are no longer\nvisible via readdir/getdents because offset_readdir() stops listing\nentries once an entry\u0027s offset is larger than octx-\u003enext_offset.\nThese entries vanish persistently -- they can be looked up, but will\nnever again appear in readdir(3) output.\n\nThe reason for this is that the commit treats directory offsets as\nmonotonically increasing integer values rather than opaque cookies,\nand introduces this comparison:\n\n\tif (dentry2offset(dentry) \u003e= last_index) {\n\nOn 64-bit platforms, the directory offset value upper bound is\n2^63 - 1. Directory offsets will monotonically increase for millions\nof years without wrapping.\n\nOn 32-bit platforms, however, LONG_MAX is 2^31 - 1. The allocator\ncan wrap after only a few weeks (at worst).\n\nRevert commit 64a7ce76fb90 (\"libfs: fix infinite directory reads for\noffset dir\") to prepare for a fix that can work properly on 32-bit\nsystems and might apply to recent LTS kernels where shmem employs\nthe simple_offset mechanism.",
"id": "GHSA-qxjr-36pm-q2q2",
"modified": "2025-02-14T18:30:49Z",
"published": "2025-02-12T15:31:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f250b82040a72b0059ae00855a74d8570ad2147"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e9e710f68bac49bd9b587823c077d06363440e0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b662d858131da9a8a14e68661656989b14dbf113"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.