GHSA-QXH5-H6MX-QV45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-16 18:31 – Updated: 2025-12-16 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in command parsers
The kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd() and kvaser_usb_leaf_read_bulk_callback
functions contain logic to zero-length commands. These commands are used
to align data to the USB endpoint's wMaxPacketSize boundary.
The driver attempts to skip these placeholders by aligning the buffer
position pos to the next packet boundary using round_up() function.
However, if zero-length command is found exactly on a packet boundary
(i.e., pos is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize, including 0), round_up
function will return the unchanged value of pos. This prevents pos
to be increased, causing an infinite loop in the parsing logic.
This patch fixes this in the function by using pos + 1 instead.
This ensures that even if pos is on a boundary, the calculation is
based on pos + 1, forcing round_up() to always return the next
aligned boundary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68308"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-16T16:16:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncan: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in command parsers\n\nThe `kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd()` and `kvaser_usb_leaf_read_bulk_callback`\nfunctions contain logic to zero-length commands. These commands are used\nto align data to the USB endpoint\u0027s wMaxPacketSize boundary.\n\nThe driver attempts to skip these placeholders by aligning the buffer\nposition `pos` to the next packet boundary using `round_up()` function.\n\nHowever, if zero-length command is found exactly on a packet boundary\n(i.e., `pos` is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize, including 0), `round_up`\nfunction will return the unchanged value of `pos`. This prevents `pos`\nto be increased, causing an infinite loop in the parsing logic.\n\nThis patch fixes this in the function by using `pos + 1` instead.\nThis ensures that even if `pos` is on a boundary, the calculation is\nbased on `pos + 1`, forcing `round_up()` to always return the next\naligned boundary.",
"id": "GHSA-qxh5-h6mx-qv45",
"modified": "2025-12-16T18:31:34Z",
"published": "2025-12-16T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68308"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/028e89c7e8b4346302e88df01cc50e0a1f05791a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0897cea266e39166a36111059ba147192b36592f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c73772cd2b8cc108d5f5334de89ad648d89b9ec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58343e0a4d43699f0e2f5b169384bbe4c0217add"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69c7825df64e24dc15d31631a1fc9145324b1345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd8135a560cf6e64f0b98ed4daadf126a38f7f48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9dd83a75a7274edef21682c823bf0b66d7b6b7f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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