GHSA-QX7J-JV8M-FPPR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 16:32 – Updated: 2026-08-18 16:32
VLAI
Summary
RabbitMQ Java client malformed body frame triggers raw command assembler exception
Details

Summary

RabbitMQ Java Client's inbound AMQP command assembly accepts a content header declaring a small body and then processes a larger body frame by throwing a raw UnsupportedOperationException from CommandAssembler. A broker peer that the client has connected to can use this malformed frame sequence to fail frame processing and tear down the client connection instead of receiving a clean protocol-level malformed-frame error.

This was discovered based on an existing vulnerability CVE-2017-15699.

Details

Inbound frames enter the client through SocketFrameHandler.readFrame, which returns frames parsed from the peer-controlled input stream (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/SocketFrameHandler.java:197). AMQConnection.MainLoop reads each frame (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:692) and dispatches non-zero-channel frames to the channel while the connection is open (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:748 and src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:766). The channel then passes the frame to the current command assembler through AMQChannel.handleFrame and AMQCommand.handleFrame (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQChannel.java:121, src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQCommand.java:114). When a content-bearing method is followed by a content header, CommandAssembler.consumeHeaderFrame records the header's declared body size in remainingBodyBytes after only checking it against the configured maximum (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:126 through src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:139). The body-frame path subtracts the received payload length from that remaining count before validating that the payload fits (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:145 through src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:149), so a body frame larger than the declared size drives the count negative and reaches the raw UnsupportedOperationException at src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:150 and src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:151. AMQConnection catches the resulting throwable in frame processing and performs connection failure handling and final shutdown (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:695 through src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:705).

PoC

poc.zip

bash ./poc/run.sh
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.UnsupportedOperationException: %%%%%% FIXME unimplemented

The UnsupportedOperationException: %%%%%% FIXME unimplemented fingerprint is the raw exception thrown at the negative remainingBodyBytes check in CommandAssembler.consumeBodyFrame. This line shows the malformed declared-size/body-size sequence reached the vulnerable assembler path.

Impact

The attacker model is a remote AMQP broker peer that the RabbitMQ Java Client application has accepted, including a malicious broker endpoint, a compromised broker, or routing that sends the client to an attacker-controlled peer. The peer needs a non-zero open channel that can receive a content-bearing server-to-client method such as basic.deliver, then sends the method frame, a content header declaring a body below the configured maximum, and a body frame whose payload exceeds that declared size. Under those conditions, the peer can force frame processing to fail with UnsupportedOperationException and close the AMQP connection, producing a client-side denial of service for work depending on that connection; the finding does not indicate memory corruption, data disclosure, or code execution.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.30.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.rabbitmq:amqp-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.31.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63335"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T16:32:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nRabbitMQ Java Client\u0027s inbound AMQP command assembly accepts a content header declaring a small body and then processes a larger body frame by throwing a raw `UnsupportedOperationException` from `CommandAssembler`. A broker peer that the client has connected to can use this malformed frame sequence to fail frame processing and tear down the client connection instead of receiving a clean protocol-level malformed-frame error. \n\nThis was discovered based on an existing vulnerability CVE-2017-15699.\n\n### Details\nInbound frames enter the client through `SocketFrameHandler.readFrame`, which returns frames parsed from the peer-controlled input stream (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/SocketFrameHandler.java:197`). `AMQConnection.MainLoop` reads each frame (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:692`) and dispatches non-zero-channel frames to the channel while the connection is open (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:748` and `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:766`). The channel then passes the frame to the current command assembler through `AMQChannel.handleFrame` and `AMQCommand.handleFrame` (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQChannel.java:121`, `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQCommand.java:114`). When a content-bearing method is followed by a content header, `CommandAssembler.consumeHeaderFrame` records the header\u0027s declared body size in `remainingBodyBytes` after only checking it against the configured maximum (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:126` through `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:139`). The body-frame path subtracts the received payload length from that remaining count before validating that the payload fits (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:145` through `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:149`), so a body frame larger than the declared size drives the count negative and reaches the raw `UnsupportedOperationException` at `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:150` and `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/CommandAssembler.java:151`. `AMQConnection` catches the resulting throwable in frame processing and performs connection failure handling and final shutdown (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:695` through `src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/AMQConnection.java:705`).\n\n### PoC\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28182717/poc.zip)\n\n```bash\nbash ./poc/run.sh\n```\n\n```text\nException in thread \"main\" java.lang.UnsupportedOperationException: %%%%%% FIXME unimplemented\n```\n\nThe `UnsupportedOperationException: %%%%%% FIXME unimplemented` fingerprint is the raw exception thrown at the negative `remainingBodyBytes` check in `CommandAssembler.consumeBodyFrame`. This line shows the malformed declared-size/body-size sequence reached the vulnerable assembler path.\n\n### Impact\nThe attacker model is a remote AMQP broker peer that the RabbitMQ Java Client application has accepted, including a malicious broker endpoint, a compromised broker, or routing that sends the client to an attacker-controlled peer. The peer needs a non-zero open channel that can receive a content-bearing server-to-client method such as `basic.deliver`, then sends the method frame, a content header declaring a body below the configured maximum, and a body frame whose payload exceeds that declared size. Under those conditions, the peer can force frame processing to fail with `UnsupportedOperationException` and close the AMQP connection, producing a client-side denial of service for work depending on that connection; the finding does not indicate memory corruption, data disclosure, or code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-qx7j-jv8m-fppr",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T16:32:43Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T16:32:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-qx7j-jv8m-fppr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/1959"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/1960"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/31735344d9f9dfc53740b67f06e560e8846b9322"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/abd6d60d4e2bfc1a327dc90ab246b2e8aca1f33b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.31.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RabbitMQ Java client malformed body frame triggers raw command assembler exception"
}



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