GHSA-QX66-FV34-FJM8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:22 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:22Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can craft a URL to a server function in an affected TanStack Start app. If someone opens the link, the app can return attacker-controlled HTML from its own origin and run the attacker's JavaScript there. The script can access same-origin data available to that visitor and make requests with their authority.
Cause
The server-function transport can pass request payload fields into internal middleware state instead of limiting them to public input fields. A malformed payload can leave an attacker-controlled result in the error path. Response handling can then treat a response-shaped object as an HTTP response.
Affected versions
Published versions of @tanstack/start-server-core, @tanstack/react-start, @tanstack/solid-start, and @tanstack/vue-start from 1.143.12 up to, but not including, their respective patched versions are affected. The patched versions are @tanstack/start-server-core@1.169.39, @tanstack/react-start@1.168.60, @tanstack/solid-start@1.168.57, and @tanstack/vue-start@1.168.56.
Fix
The fix limits client-supplied server-function input to public fields and validates responses at the server boundary. Upgrade to the corresponding patched package version.
Temporary mitigations
For the configured server-function path, usually /_serverFn/*, an edge or WAF rule can consider blocking requests without the literal x-tsr-serverFn: true header and browser document navigations such as Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate or Accept: text/html. A restrictive Content Security Policy on server-function responses can provide another browser-side restriction. These are mitigation suggestions, not a complete fix. The header is client-controlled and is not authentication. Test rules against legitimate GET and POST server functions and use a matching version-specific backport where possible.
Credits
Lovable helped us discover and report this issue. We thank them for their help.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@tanstack/start-server-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.143.12"
},
{
"fixed": "1.169.39"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@tanstack/react-start"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.143.12"
},
{
"fixed": "1.168.60"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@tanstack/solid-start"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.143.12"
},
{
"fixed": "1.168.57"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@tanstack/vue-start"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.143.12"
},
{
"fixed": "1.168.56"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:22:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T17:17:14Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can craft a URL to a server function in an affected TanStack Start app. If someone opens the link, the app can return attacker-controlled HTML from its own origin and run the attacker\u0027s JavaScript there. The script can access same-origin data available to that visitor and make requests with their authority.\n\n## Cause\n\nThe server-function transport can pass request payload fields into internal middleware state instead of limiting them to public input fields. A malformed payload can leave an attacker-controlled result in the error path. Response handling can then treat a response-shaped object as an HTTP response.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nPublished versions of `@tanstack/start-server-core`, `@tanstack/react-start`, `@tanstack/solid-start`, and `@tanstack/vue-start` from `1.143.12` up to, but not including, their respective patched versions are affected. The patched versions are `@tanstack/start-server-core@1.169.39`, `@tanstack/react-start@1.168.60`, `@tanstack/solid-start@1.168.57`, and `@tanstack/vue-start@1.168.56`.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe fix limits client-supplied server-function input to public fields and validates responses at the server boundary. Upgrade to the corresponding patched package version.\n\n## Temporary mitigations\n\nFor the configured server-function path, usually `/_serverFn/*`, an edge or WAF rule can consider blocking requests without the literal `x-tsr-serverFn: true` header and browser document navigations such as `Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate` or `Accept: text/html`. A restrictive Content Security Policy on server-function responses can provide another browser-side restriction. These are mitigation suggestions, not a complete fix. The header is client-controlled and is not authentication. Test rules against legitimate GET and POST server functions and use a matching version-specific backport where possible.\n\n## Credits\n\nLovable helped us discover and report this issue. We thank them for their help.",
"id": "GHSA-qx66-fv34-fjm8",
"modified": "2026-10-15T20:22:21Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T20:22:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-qx66-fv34-fjm8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router/pull/8573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router/commit/d521abd71c69f1ff010bb3def4d417cb5fa058cb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router/releases/tag/release-2026-09-30-1747"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "TanStack Router: Unauthenticated reflected XSS in TanStack Start server-function responses"
}
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